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ABSTRACT
Sex-for-hire is usually illegal, unless it is being filmed. Debates
about pornography tread uneasily into legal terrain that implicates
freedom of expression under the First Amendment, the specter of
censorship, and genuine concerns about the function and role of
pornography in persistent gender inequality. It is less common for
conversations about pornography to include a discussion of copyright
law. Yet copyright law is a powerful tool that operates to protect the
financial interests of pornographers. Owners of copyrighted
pornography frequently threaten public exposure of an alleged
infringer’s consumption habits in order to force a financial
settlement. Thus copyright law operates as both a metaphoric legal
shield and sword in the hands of pornographers. This Article
introduces to the scholarly conversation consideration of how
copyright law might be used by opponents of pornography,
particularly those who oppose specific types of pornography such as
child pornography, so-called “revenge porn,” “crush porn,” or
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filmed physical abuse. A strong case can be made that such materials
do not warrant copyright protection. Copyright protection is not a
necessary prerequisite to authorship, publication or circulation.
Withholding copyright protection would sharply reduce the economic
value of these particular works, but might also give rise to
inconsistent or even incoherent decisions by government actors who
would be called upon to make difficult assessments between and
among types of pornography.
INTRODUCTION

S

1

ex-for-hire is usually illegal, unless it is being filmed. Debates
about pornography tread uneasily into legal terrain that implicates
freedom of expression under the First Amendment, the specter of
censorship, and genuine concerns about the function and role of
pornography in persistent gender inequality. It is less common for
conversations about pornography to include a discussion of copyright
law. Yet copyright law is a powerful tool that operates to protect the
financial interests of those pornographers who rely heavily on the
copyright laws to deter unauthorized copying. It is not uncommon for
the owner of copyrighted pornography to threaten public exposure of
an alleged infringer’s consumption habits to force a financial
settlement of unauthorized copying claims. Copyright law operates
both as a metaphoric shield and sword in the hands of pornographers.
This Article turns the scholarly conversation to consider how
copyright law might be used by those who oppose specific types of
pornography such as child pornography,2 “crush porn,”3 so-called
“revenge porn,”4 or filmed physical abuse.5
To the extent that actual people are harmed during the production
of pornographic material or as a consequence of its distribution and
consumption, a strong case can be made that the government
constitutionally may decline to provide copyright protection. The
rationale for declining to provide copyright protection is that these
materials cannot reasonably be construed as promoting “progress” or

1
2
3
4
5

See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.3.
See infra Part III.B.4.
See infra Part III.B.5.
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“useful arts” because their production or distribution directly harms
people. Withholding copyright protections would sharply reduce the
economic value of these particular works without unconstitutionally
preventing their authorship or precluding their publication or
circulation. Such an approach to copyright protection, however,
would require government actors to make difficult assessments about
which pornographic works belonged in the nonprotected categories,
and their decisions might not be consistent or even coherent.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides an overview of
the relationship of copyright law to pornography. Copyright law,
viewed in a certain light, plays a structural role in the
commoditization of sex and sexual images. In most jurisdictions in
the United States, buying and selling sex is illegal, but when sex-forhire is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, it becomes an act of
7
free speech protected by the First Amendment. That tangible
medium also gains protection under copyright law. Pornographers use
copyright law to facilitate profitable commercial exploitation of their
works.
Against this background, Part II explores the ways in which
copyright law in general is not content neutral. Indeed, in order to
obtain a protectable copyright, one must demonstrate the existence of
“original” content. Once a copyright is secured, copyright law
constructs operate to suppress (by labeling as “infringing,” and thus
illegal) any content that is substantially similar to or derivative of the
copyrighted work. From an analytic perspective that suppression
operates as a form of content-based, government-sponsored
censorship in the broadest sense of the word. To be sure, copyright
law allows for “fair use” as a right or privilege, or as an affirmative
defense to an allegation of copyright infringement. In this way,
copyright law includes a mechanism that seeks to soften the
suppressive aspect of copyright enforcement. Whether an
unauthorized use is “fair” is a legal determination that is, by
definition, not content neutral (i.e., it requires substantive
consideration of the allegedly offending work). Thus robust copyright
protection for any book, image, film, or other copyrightable work

6 Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power
. . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7 See infra Part I.
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requires (at least) two content-specific inquiries by the government:
first as to the originality of the initial work, and second as to any fair
use by any allegedly offending work.
Part III considers the relationship between pornography and
copyright law. Numerous legal scholars have offered critiques and
8
defenses of pornography that are sophisticated and sustained. One of
the most well-known critiques of pornography takes a harms-based
approach.9 It considers the potential harm to actual human beings
during the production, distribution, or consumption of pornography.
This part of the Article applies this harms-based framework in the
copyright context and considers how labeling such works nonprogressive or non-useful would put them beyond the purview of the
Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Types of
pornography that would lose copyright protection under this
framework include child pornography, crush pornography, revenge
pornography, and pornography in which the performers are physically
abused or endangered.
Part IV argues that the government’s withholding of copyright
protection from this narrowly defined band of pornographic works
will reduce the incentives for its creation and distribution. Thus
copyright law could become a powerful tool in the hands of
pornography’s opponents.
Part V argues that there is, in fact, a clear precedent for amending
the Copyright Act to deny protection to “non-progressive” and “nonuseful” pornographic works. In the trademark context, the Lanham
Act10 prohibits the federal registration of “scandalous” or “immoral”
marks. Such content-specific restriction has been found to be
constitutionally permissible.11 Although that prohibition is enforced
inconsistently, it nevertheless suggests the contours of legitimate,
content-based denial of formal governmental protection for certain
intellectual property.

8 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J.
589 (1986); Robert Jensen & Debbie Okrina, Pornography and Sexual Violence,
VAWNET.ORG (July 2004), http://www.vawnet.org/sexual-violence/print-document.php
?doc_id=418&find_type=web_desc_AR.
9 See infra Part III.A.
10 Lanham (Trademark) Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
11 See infra Part V.B.
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I
COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE COMMODITIZATION OF SEX
Pornography is a wildly lucrative copyrightable commodity.12 And
though this sounds like a bad joke, the reproduction right is heavily
relied upon by commercial pornographers.13 Anyone on the Internet
is generally only a click or typographical error away from
pornography, much of which is profitably distributed by mainstream
American corporations.14 Copyright law has played an important role
in the law and economics of pornography since 1979, when a federal
court concluded that pornographic films were eligible for copyright
protection just like any other kind of movie.15 Instantiation of a legal
norm protecting the making of commercial pornography under the
auspices of dominant First Amendment jurisprudence if all parties are
eighteen or older came almost a decade later.16 The importance of
copyright protection to pornographers has increased greatly since the
17
Internet has become their primary distribution mechanism. To

12 See Michael Brush, Porn Stocks Worth, Um, Watching, MSN MONEY (Oct. 31, 2007,
12:01 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/20071102065704/http://articles.moneycentral.msn
.com/Investing/CompanyFocus/PornStocksWorthUmWatching.aspx
(accessed
by
searching for original URL in the Internet Archive “Wayback Machine”); Jerry Ropelato,
Internet Pornography Statistics, TOP TEN REVIEWS, http://internet-filter-review
.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2011) (“The
pornography industry has larger revenues than Microsoft, Google, Amazon, eBay, Yahoo,
Apple and Netflix combined. 2006 Worldwide Pornography Revenues ballooned to $97.06
billion.”); see also Richard Corliss, That Old Feeling: When Porno Was Chic, TIME (Mar.
29, 2005), available at http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1043267,00.html.
13 See generally Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”), 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006).
14 See Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0, 10 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 799, 806–07 (2008) (describing mainstream commercial success of consumer
goods bearing Playboy logo and brand, Playboy’s separate investments in hardcore
pornography business, and financial profit from pornography by hoteliers and
communications industry concerns); Advertising Policies, GOOGLE, http://support
.google.com/adwordspolicy/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=176004 (last visited Sept. 9,
2012) (noting that Google allows advertising for adult sites, with limitations); see also
DAVID A. VISE, THE GOOGLE STORY 165 (updated ed. 2005) (“Google makes millions of
dollars annually on pornography ads displayed alongside search results. . . . [B]oth Google
and its biggest competitor, Yahoo, profit handsomely by selling sex-related ads.”).
15 See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (discussing the Freeman case).
17 See Nicholas Confessore, Porn and Politics in a Digital Age, PBS FRONTLINE (Feb.
7,
2002),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/porn/special/politics.html
(observing promulgation of home computers facilitates production and distribution of
pornography); see also Katie Hafner & Matt Richtel, Google Resists U.S. Subpoena of
Search Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2006/01/20/technology/20google.html?pagewanted=all (“American Web sites that show
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illustrate briefly, Google received more copyright-rooted cease and
desist letters related to adult content than to mainstream movies.
Adult-content complaints were second in number only to complaints
18
pertaining to music.
A. The Contours of Copyrightable Sex
Pornography can take the form of written accounts19 or visual
images, moving or static, of human beings explicitly engaged in sex
acts, or depicted in overtly sexualized poses. Pornographic works are
potentially vested with copyright protection upon creation and
20
21
fixation in tangible mediums of expression as literary works,
22
23
dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works,24 motion pictures and other
25
26
audiovisual works, or compilations or derivative works.
If commoditized sex follows the same commercial patterns as other
kinds of physical performances such as dance choreography,
pantomimes, or yoga, most of the sex-related copyrights in
contemporary currency are fixed in the form of literary, pictorial and
27
audiovisual works. Alternative means of fixation such as notation

explicit content get as many as 60 million visitors a day, according to testimony given to
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation by Paul Cambria,
general counsel for the Adult Freedom Foundation, an organization that represents the
interests of the pornography industry.”).
18 Data
from the Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, CHILLING EFFECTS,
http://www.chillingeffects.org/stats.cgi (last visited Mar. 30, 2011) (reporting number of
complaints in 2010 was 966 for movies, 2,021 for adult content, and 3,906 for music).
19 The production of written pornography is extremely unlikely to be harmful to the
author, unless there is direct coercion at play. Whether exclusively textual works can even
constitute pornography is disputed. See, e.g., Dana Wollman, Amazon No Longer Selling
Guide for Pedophiles, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 11, 2010, 9:17 AM), http://seattletimes
.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2013405553_apustecamazonpedophiliabook1stldwritethru.
html (revealing President of American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression takes
the view that entirely textual works are not pornography).
20 See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (2006).
21 Id. § 102(a)(1).
22 Id. § 102(a)(3).
23 Id. § 102(a)(4).
24 Id. § 102(a)(5).
25 Id. § 102(a)(6).
26 Id. § 103.
27 See Dramatic Works: Scripts, Pantomimes, and Choreography, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl119.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2011) [hereinafter
Copyright Office, Dramatic Works]. Cf. Lhendup Gyatso Bhutia, Saving Yoga From
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may be possible, but would likely be expensive, overly complicated,
and of uncertain monetary value.29
Commercial control of traditional choreographic works probably
relies more on norms about copying and attribution within the dance
industry than on formal copyright protections.30 This makes
analogizing sex and dance moves analytically unhelpful in discerning
the impact of copyright law, despite the fact that dancing has been
characterized as “the vertical expression of a horizontal desire,
31
legalized by music.” Whether there are similar norms within the
pornography industry is unknown to this author, but I have not seen
any evidence of them. Commercial pornographers seem to make their
creative choices in direct response to perceived consumer demand, 32
which apparently leads to heavy concentrations of very similar
audiovisual works within popular genres such as gonzo, all-girl, older
woman-younger girl, young girl, anal-themed, big butt, oral, ethnicthemed, interracial, big bust, MILF, internal, orgy, gangbang, BDSM,
squirting, strap-on, transsexual, three way, and double penetration.33

Copyright Mongers, DNA DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS (July 18, 2010, 12:22 AM),
http://www.dnaindia.com/lifestyle/report_saving-yoga-from-copyright-mongers_141120
6-all.
28 Copyright Office, Dramatic Works, supra note 27.
29 See Joi Michelle Lakes, A pas de deux for Choreography and Copyright, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1829, 1853–55 (2005) (discussing notation-based means of fixing choreographic
works); see also Julie Van Camp, Copyright of Choreographic Works, in 1994–1995
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 59, 67 (Stephen F. Breimer et
al. eds., 1994), available at http://www.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/copyrigh.html.
30 See William Patry, Choreography and Alternatives to Copyright Law, THE PATRY
COPYRIGHT BLOG (Aug. 18, 2005, 1:45 PM), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/08
/choreography-and-alternatives-to.html (observing relatively low number of copyright
registrations by choreographers suggests “choreographers’ decision not to rely on
copyright and to instead develop their own ‘community’ system of protection”).
31 Compare George Bernard Shaw Quotes, THINKEXIST.COM, http://thinkexist.com
/quotation/dancing-the_vertical_expression_of_a_horizontal/259005.html (last visited
Mar. 5, 2012) (crediting the quote to George Bernard Shaw), with Robert Frost: Quotes,
GOODREADS.COM, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/show/123294 (last visited Mar. 5,
2012) (crediting the quote to Robert Frost).
32 Some pornography is likely produced for reasons other than commercial exploitation.
See generally Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1746343 (arguing that there are natural and intrinsic reasons for creation above and
beyond the incentives provided by the copyright regime).
33 These are all awards categories for the Adult Video Network annual awards.
Nominations for the 2011 AVN Awards, AVN MEDIA NETWORK, http://avnawards.avn
.com/2011_nominations.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
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Elements such as dialogue, plot, costumes, and scenery are
copyrightable just as they are in non-pornographic works. But what
the scope of copyright protection might be in a choreographed
sequence of explicit sex acts is unclear. One commentator has
advocated for a very broad definition of choreography, which could
conceivably include sex acts, writing:
The precise meaning of “choreographic works” is not clear,
however, from prior statutes or case law. Nor is there any evidence
that Congress intended to limit “choreographic works” to those
which were protected previously under the category of dramaticomusical work. Indeed, the creation of the new category of
“choreographic works” in the copyright law suggests that Congress
intended to create a broader class of protection. Clearly, Congress
intended that the Copyright Act provide categories eligible for
protection with “sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or
outmoded concepts of the scope of particular categories.” . . . .
Human movement would seem to be the central element of
dance, but it is at least arguable that even this requirement is too
narrow. In Duet, Paul Taylor and his partner do nothing but sit on
stage, in silence, for three minutes. In 1942, George Balanchine
choreographed Circus Polka to music by Stravinsky “for 50
elephants and 50 beautiful girls” for the Barnum and Bailey Circus.
Another problem with focusing solely on human movement is that it
is also central in gymnastic routines and figure skating routines,
which arguably might be subject to protection as “choreographic
works.” An issue for dance scholars is where to draw the line
between choreographic movement and other movement. Are there
some movement designs which should not be protected by this
34
copyright provision? On what grounds?

Protectable dance choreography was described in Horgan v.
MacMillan as “the composition and arrangement of dance movements
and patterns, [which] is usually intended to be accompanied by
music.”35 The Second Circuit concluded that “social dance steps and
simple routines” are not copyrightable.36 Analogously pedestrian
sexual encounters would not be either. Heterosexual intercourse in the
missionary position might be one very staid example of an
uncopyrightably banal erotic routine. Any sex act that is prevalent in
real life or pornography has arguably been dedicated to the public

34

Van Camp, supra note 29, at 60–61 (footnotes omitted).
789 F.2d 157, 161 (1986) (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 2 THE COMPENDIUM OF
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 450.01 (1984)).
36 Id. at 161 (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 2 THE COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT
OFFICE PRACTICES § 450.03(a) (1984)).
35
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domain by virtue of copyright’s merger and scènes à faire doctrines;
courts will not enforce a copyright monopoly on words expressing an
idea if the concept can only be expressed in a limited number of ways,
or if the expression embodied in the work flows from a commonplace
idea.37 Sets, props, camera angles, dialogue, and the overall sequence
of sex acts would confer copyright in a particular performance, but it
might be thin, especially with respect to the sexual component.
Like sex, yoga can be comprised of a series of widely practiced and
fairly predictable physical moves. In a lawsuit involving claims of
infringement of an allegedly copyright-protected series of yoga
asanas, one of the works at issue was described by the plaintiff as a
“compilation of exercises.”38 The case ultimately settled, but before it
did there was a district court opinion denying the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment, based on a rather doctrinally dubious
conclusion that if the plaintiff established at trial that his copyright in
the Bikram yoga style was valid, under Section 106(a)(4) he would
retain the exclusive right to authorize the public performance of his
39
sequence of asanas. This claim is highly contested in the context of
cultural commoditization,40 and has subsequently been undercut by a
decision by the U.S. Copyright Office to stop registering yoga poses
41
and their sequences as choreographic works. The Copyright Office

37 See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining
the merger doctrine); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986)
(explaining the scènes à faire doctrine).
38 William Patry, Yoga and Copyright, THE PATRY COPYRIGHT B LOG (Aug. 22, 2005,
10:30 PM), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/08/yoga-and-copyright.html (referring
to Open Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhury, No. C 03-3182 PJH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10440 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005), and arguing that “[a] decision that Bikram had a copyright
in a pictorial compilation of 26 exercises or in narration about them would be
uncontroversial, no more so than a compilation of someone’s choices of the best Indian
restaurants in New York City,” but that the court’s extending copyright protection to
public performance of the exercises was “controversial, indeed, outrageously wrong”).
39 See id. (expressing surprise that “a court would entertain the possibility that one
could acquire exclusive rights over the performance of yoga exercises”).
40 See, e.g., Paul Vitello, Hindu Group Stirs a Debate Over Yoga’s Soul, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/nyregion
/28yoga.html?_r=1&sq=hindu&st=cse&scp=1&pagewanted=all; Meredith Hoffman, Off
the Mat, Into Court: Lawsuit Pits Bikram and Yoga to the People, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM
(Dec. 1, 2011, 7:22 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/off-the-mat-into
-court-lawsuit-pits-bikram-and-yoga-to-the-people/?hp.
41 See, e.g., Tarsha Luke, Hold Your Flow! Yoga Sequences Not Copyrightable, MEDIA
LAW BYTES & PIECES (June 27, 2012), http://www.medialawbytesandpieces.com/2012/06
/27/hold-your-flow-yoga-sequences-not-copyrightable/#page=1. See also Ellen Rosen,
Yoga Pose Copyright Bid Too Much of a Stretch, U.S. Says in Bikram Battle, BLOOMBERG
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also issued a related statement on June 12, 2012, that said in pertinent
part:
An example that has occupied the attention of the Copyright Office
for quite some time involves the copyrightability of the selection
and arrangement of preexisting exercises, such as yoga poses.
Interpreting the statutory definition of “compilation” in isolation
could lead to the conclusion that a sufficiently creative selection,
coordination or arrangement of public domain yoga poses is
copyrightable as a compilation of such poses or exercises. However,
under the policy stated herein, a claim in a compilation of exercises
or the selection and arrangement of yoga poses will be refused
registration. Exercise is not a category of authorship in section 102
and thus a compilation of exercises would not be copyrightable
42
subject matter.

Efforts to monopolize depictions of sexual intercourse would likely
be similarly resisted. In addition, though unique sequences of sex acts
might be adequately expressive and original enough to warrant
copyright protection as a theoretical matter, whether judges would be
willing and able to comfortably articulate a coherent standard for the
copyrightability of copulation variations is uncertain.43
B. Literal Copying and Infringement Allegations
Fairly extensive case law research by this author suggests that the
vast majority of copyright infringement cases that have been brought
in which the plaintiff works were articles of commercial pornography
have been premised on allegations of literal copying. No case in
which infringement liability related to unauthorized use of a
commercial work of pornography was based on copying that
constituted substantial similarity or an unauthorized derivative work
was uncovered by this author’s research.44 The reproduction right

(Dec. 9, 2011, 10:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-10/yoga-poses-can
-t-be-registered-for-copyrights-u-s-says-1-.html.
42 Registration of Claims to Copyright, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,605, 37,607 (June 22, 2012) (to
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (emphasis added), available at http://www.gpo.gov
/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-06-22/pdf/2012-15235.pdf.
43 See Lakes, supra note 29, at 1853–55; see also S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG., STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTYSIXTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION PURSUANT TO S. RES. 240 (Comm. Print 1961)
(Borge Varmer), available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/study28.pdf.
44 In International Media Films, Inc. v. Lucas Entertainment, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged
facts that, if proven, might have resulted in a finding of infringement based on the
distribution of an unauthorized derivative work, but were unable to show they held the
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provided to copyright holders in Section 106 of the Copyright Act has
been successfully exercised by pornographers only in the most direct
manner. The scope of copyright protection in a work of mainstream
45
pornography appears to be judicially untested. Literal copying has
46
either been found infringing or held to be fair use.47
1. Pornography as Creative Endeavor?
Not everyone views pornography as a creative endeavor. Some
observers perceive a distinction between, for example, artistic
audiovisual works in which there happens to be “unsimulated” (by
which they mean actual) sex performed, and works of pornography in
which there is little imaginative concern about plot, dialogue, scenery,
or any other variable that is not directly related to the depicted sexual
exploits.48 This reflects an entertainment industry perspective, which
may or may not be widely held, that audiovisual pornography is a less

restored copyright in the plaintiff’s work. 703 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(finding disputed chain of title in restored copyright). In Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Market
Group, Ltd., the plaintiff’s work was a nonpornographic work, Star Wars, while the
defendant’s work was a pornographic parody, Star Ballz. 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (N.D.
Cal. 2002).
45 See John Schwartz, The Pornography Industry vs. Digital Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8, 2004, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/08/business/the
-pornography-industry-vs-digital-pirates.html (correction appended Feb. 29, 2004)
(referencing only copyright infringement actions brought against competing companies for
acts of literal copying).
46 See Blackman v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 800 F.2d 1160, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Flava
Works, Inc. v. Wyche, No. 10 CV 0748, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64165, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
June 28, 2010); Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. C06-03926, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31639, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2007); Nova Prods., Inc. v. Kisma Video, Inc.,
No. 02 Civ. 3850(HB), 02 Civ. 6277(HB), 03 Civ. 3379(HB), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24171, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004); Sefton v. Webbworld, Inc., No. 3:00-CV-0042-AH,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6431, at *8–9 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2003); Sefton v. Jew, 204
F.R.D. 104, 107 n.3 (W.D. Tex. 2000); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc.,
982 F. Supp. 503, 515 (N.D. Ohio 1997). Cf. United States v. Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517,
1519 (11th Cir. 1984); Brush Creek Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, No. C-02-3491 EDL, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15321, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002).
47 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1536
(D.C. Cal. 1985). Cf. The Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 128
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (detailing how plaintiff claimed copyright in wrapper for cinnamon rolls;
defendant made pornographic parody).
48 See Kristin Hohenadel, FILM; Film Goes All the Way (In the Name of Art), N.Y.
TIMES, (July 1, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/01/movies/film-film-goes-all-the
-way-in-the-name-of-art.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (referencing unsimulated sex in
films).
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creative or perhaps even noncreative commodity. Pornography is
sometimes characterized as something that is “used,” distinguishable
in some qualitative way from mainstream literary or audiovisual
50
works that contain sex scenes. Jim Mitchell reportedly quipped that
the only “art” in pornography was his brother Artie, a fellow
pornographer with the given name of Arthur.51 As law professors
Christopher Sprigman and Kal Raustiala have noted, “Pornography is,
in large part, a utilitarian product, and for most consumers, the
purpose for which it is employed is served . . . by a five-minute porn52
tube clip.” Another commentator observed that “in hotel rooms
where pornography is available, two-thirds of all movie purchases are
53
for pornos; and the average time they are watched is 12 minutes.”
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a jurist would, sua sponte,
determine that a pedestrian pornographic work was an “idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery” within the meaning of Section 102 of the Copyright
Act, and therefore outside the purview of copyright protections
54
altogether. The utilitarian nature of some pornography does not
preclude copyright protection but may render it thin, perhaps so
limited in scope that it could be infringed only by literal copying.

49 See Schwartz, supra note 45 (“Mr. Cambria suggests that the mainstream
entertainment industry is much more combative when it comes to consumers partly
because the songs and movies are so carefully and expensively made and distributed.
Movies in [the pornography] industry, by contrast, are often made in a few weeks, and on
budgets that a major studio may spend on coffee and pastries, so piracy is not taken quite
as seriously. ‘Maybe a classic is one thing,’ he said, ‘but they’re not all classics.’”).
50 See, e.g., Irving Kristol, Pornography, Obscenity, and the Case for Censorship, in
SEX, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 174, 176 (Lori Gruen & George E. Panichas eds., 1997)
(asserting that pornography and obscene materials “in the end [are] identical in effect”).
51 Michael Carlson, Spiking Deep Throat: Gerard Damiano And Jim Mitchell’s
Guardian Obituaries, IRRESISTIBLE TARGETS (Mar. 6, 2009), http://irresistibletargets
.blogspot.com/2009/03/buried-deep-throat-gerard-damiano-and.html; see also Corliss,
supra note 12 (“There’s a lot of porn out there. . . . For the weary businessman it’s just a
combination [sic] Viagra and Ambien.”).
52 Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, Copyrighting Porn: A Guest Post, FREAKONOMICS
(May 5, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/copy
righting-porn-a-guest-post/.
53 Corliss, supra note 12.
54 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
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2. Knowing Pornography When One Sees It
Unlike audiovisual works, a judge might well conclude that
elements of pornographic pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works were
55
functional and therefore unprotectable through copyright. Sex toys
such as vibrators, dildos, butt plugs, nipple clamps, and cock rings
can certainly simultaneously evince artistic as well as utilitarian
aspects. But in at least one dispute, a court found dildos lacking
conceptual separability because they were cast from molds of the
genitals of pornography performers, and therefore uncopyrightable.56
In and of themselves, sex toys would not generally constitute
pornography.
Pornography is difficult to qualitatively define beyond
“unambiguous depictions of sexual activity.”57 When the Supreme
Court decided Miller v. California in 1973, Chief Justice Burger
characterized the dispute as “one of a group of ‘obscenitypornography’ cases being reviewed by the Court,”58 implying that the
terms obscenity and pornography were interchangeable.59 This is no
longer true, if it ever was.
In American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, the City of
Indianapolis defined pornography in a civil rights ordinance as “the
graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures
or in words” that also includes one or more of six other listed
60
characteristics. This definition of pornography was held to be

55 See id. § 113; see also ABA Committee No. 304, PICTORIAL, GRAPHIC,
SCULPTURAL AND CHOREOGRAPHIC WORKS (2005–2006), available at http://meetings
.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/PT030400/otherlinks_files/304.pdf.
56 ConWest Res, Inc. v. Playtime Novelties, Inc., No. C 06-5304 SBA, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 85461, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2006).
57 See Erick Janssen, Why People Use Porn, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org
/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/porn/special/why.html (last visited July 6, 2012) (“Although
lawyers, feminists, priests, and scientists all have tried to describe it, a satisfactory
definition of porn does not exist.”).
58 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973).
59 He also used the term “hardcore pornography” as if it had a generally accepted
meaning. See, e.g., id. at 27.
60 Am. Bookseller’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985). Those
conditions were:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in
being raped; or
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unconstitutional when it was proposed as the basis for redress for civil
rights violations through administrative and judicial means.61 It was
criticized for being “considerably different” from the judicially
constructed definition of obscenity that is met when the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that
a work holistically appeals to the prurient interests, contains patently
offensive depictions or descriptions of specified sexual conduct, and
has no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.62 This
“considerable difference” was entirely intentional, part of a conscious
effort to promote recognition of the harms of pornography outside of
the confines of the Miller test.63 After Hudnut it became less common
for courts or legal commentators to use the terms “pornography” and
“obscenity” interchangeably. The current practice is to divide
pornography into two categories: that which is obscene, and that

(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or
bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or
severed into body parts; or
(4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury abasement, torture,
shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes
these conditions sexual; or
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation,
exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility or
submission or display.
. . . [T]he use of men, children, or transsexuals in the place of women in
paragraphs (1) through (6) above shall also constitute pornography under this
section.
Id.
61 Id. at 332 (“The definition of ‘pornography’ is unconstitutional. No construction or
excision of particular terms could save it. The offense of trafficking in pornography
necessarily falls with the definition. We express no view on the district court’s conclusions
that the ordinance is vague and that it establishes a prior restraint. Neither is necessary to
our judgment. We also express no view on the argument presented by several amici that
the ordinance is itself a form of discrimination on account of sex.”).
62 Id. at 324 (“Indianapolis enacted an ordinance defining ‘pornography’ as a practice
that discriminates against women. ‘Pornography’ is to be redressed through the
administrative and judicial methods used for other discrimination. The City’s definition of
‘pornography’ is considerably different from ‘obscenity,’ which the Supreme Court has
held is not protected by the First Amendment.”).
63 See, e.g., Pornography: An Exchange: Catharine A. MacKinnon, reply by Ronald
Dworkin, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Mar. 3, 1994), http://www.nybooks.com/articles
/archives/1994/mar/03/pornography-an-exchange/ (“Since then, every argument [Andrea
Dworkin and I] have advanced to support this initiative has been an equality argument.
Every harm pornography does is a harm of inequality, and we have said so.”).
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64

which is not. Obscene pornography, to paraphrase and streamline
the Miller test, is pornography which the average person would feel
appeals to prurient interests, depicts or describes sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value, if that person was framing her conclusions by
consciously making reference to contemporary community
65
standards.
Rare is the legal test that does not require a fact finder to
objectively apply subjective criteria to something or another.
Consider what a jury is asked to do when evaluating the negligence of
a defendant in the context of a tort action, or when comparing two
works to discern whether they are substantially similar in a copyright
infringement dispute. Nevertheless, obscenity inquiries are especially
thorny. Whether a work is legally obscene, and therefore illegal,
depends upon the viewpoint of an observer and that observer’s
assumptions about fellow community members: who they are, what
they think generally, and how they might react, emotionally and
66
aesthetically, to a particular work. Because this is so subjective, the
meaning of “obscene” can vary widely from person to person.67 This
would be problematic if criminal obscenity charges were commonly
68
brought, but they are not.
C. Buying and Selling Sex Legally
Though commoditized sex may sometimes constitute expressive
conduct, prostitution is either regulated as commerce or criminalized.
When commoditized sex is fixed in a tangible medium of expression,
however, it becomes protected speech—commoditized sex that is
legal, socially acceptable, and copyrighted.

64 See, e.g., Obscenity and Pornography: Behavioral Aspects—Obscenity and
Pornography Defined, L. LIBR. – AM. L. & LEGAL INFO., http://law.jrank.org/pages/1609
/Obscenity-Pornography-Behavioral-Aspects-Obscenity-pornography-defined.html (last
visited Jan. 24, 2011).
65 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
66 See id.; Brief Amici Curiae of the Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, et al. in Support of
Appellees, Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (No. 96-511); see also Amy
Adler, All Porn All the Time, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 695, 700 (2007).
67 The most frequently quoted Supreme Court opinion on obscenity is Justice Stewart’s
“I know it when I see it” concurrence. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
68 See Bartow, supra note 14, at 821–22.
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When it is not filmed, prostitution is illegal in most, though not all,
U.S. jurisdictions.69 In regions where it is illegal, it is zealously
prosecuted in some contexts but virtually ignored in others.70 Selling
sex is far more likely to result in an arrest or criminal conviction than
buying sex.71 Prostitutes and pimps are usually targeted, but johns
ignored, based on choices made by law enforcement officials rather
72
than the criminal code that is in effect. When it is filmed, the
operative definitions change. The sellers of sex are “performers”
rather than “prostitutes” and those who orchestrate the activities are
“pornographers” rather than “johns” or “pimps.”
For over two decades, obscenity prosecutions related to
pornography have been very rare; the U.S. government has
overwhelmingly ignored pornography as long as the performers in
any given work are eighteen years old or over.73 State governments
74
have largely followed suit because in California v. Freeman, the
U.S. Supreme Court sharply curtailed states’ ability to regulate the
production of pornography by declining to review the California
Supreme Court’s decision that hiring and paying people to engage in
sexual acts pursuant to the production of pornographic films did not
constitute pandering under the relevant provision of the California
75
Penal Code.
This instantiated the perception that producing
pornography is legal even in jurisdictions where prostitution is not.

69 Daniel J. Franklin, Prostitution and Sex Workers, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 355, 356–
57 (2007) (listing state prostitution statutes).
70 See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1726
(2006) (“Police response times are slow citywide by national standards—and they’re worst
in the highest-crime areas. And the officers patrolling those neighborhoods are the
department’s least experienced.”) (citation omitted).
71 Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Empirical Analysis of Street-Level
Prostitution, 4–5 (Sept. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://economics
.uchicago.edu/pdf/Prostitution%205.pdf.
72 See Sergio Herzog, The Lenient Social and Legal Response to Trafficking in Women:
An Empirical Analysis of Public Perceptions in Israel, 24 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 314
(2008), available at http://ccj.sagepub.com/content/24/3/314; Elaine Pearson, Half-hearted
Protection: What Does Victim Protection Really Mean for Victims of Trafficking in
Europe?, 10 GENDER & DEV. 56 (2002).
73 See Bartow, supra note 14, at 821–22 (observing a decline in adult obscenity charges
during administration of George W. Bush).
74 California v. Freeman, 488 U.S. 1311 (1989).
75 Id. at 1313 (Justice O’Connor acknowledging state interest in controlling prostitution
but deferring to state law determination that paying for sexual performances for
pornographic films is not pandering under state-law definition).
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The impact of this Supreme Court non-decision has been profound.
Acts that otherwise qualify as prostitution transmogrify into
pornography when they are recorded. If a camera is present, an illegal
act of selling sex becomes a legal exercise of free expression. That
may sound facially absurd, but consider the recent holding in State v.
Theriault, in which the legality of paying people to watch them have
76
sex was at issue. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire overturned
one of the defendant’s convictions for prostitution because it was
based on his offering to pay a couple for having sexual intercourse
77
while he videotaped them. However, the Theriault defendant was
unable to successfully appeal another prostitution conviction under
the same statute where he had simply “offered to pay [a] couple to
engage in sexual intercourse with each other, and explained that he
would need to watch them.”78 A request to pay two individuals to
make a sexually explicit video was held to be protected under the free
79
speech guarantees of the New Hampshire State Constitution. But
the First Amendment offered no cognizable protection for mere
voyeurism.80 The presence of a camera was the difference between
legal and illegal conduct, pornography and prostitution, even though
in both cases the couple was to be paid for having sex while an
observer was present.81
The camera-based divide between pornography and prostitution
has important commercial and cultural ramifications.82 While it may
be hard to imagine companies like General Motors, Google, Marriott,
or Fox News openly operating brothels, their engagement in the
pornography industry means that commercial sex that directly profits
them is bought and sold.83 Pornography and prostitution are treated

76

State v. Theriault, 960 A.2d 687 (N.H. 2008).
Id. at 692.
78 State v. Theriault, 949 A.2d 678, 679 (N.H. 2008).
79 Theriault, 960 A.2d at 692.
80 See Theriault, 949 A.2d at 681.
81 Compare id. with Theriault, 949 A.2d. at 692. See also Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Pornography as Trafficking, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 993, 996–97 (2005) (“To distinguish
pornography from prostitution, for example, California courts notwithstanding, is to deny
the obvious: when you make pornography of a woman, you make a prostitute out of her.”).
82 See generally Sherry F. Colb, The Legal Line Between Porn and Prostitution,
CNN.COM (Aug. 12, 2005), http://articles.cnn.com/2005-08-12/justice/colb.pornography
_1_prostitution-ring-sexual-services-pornography?_s=PM:LAW.
83 See GAIL DINES, PORNLAND: HOW PORN HAS HIJACKED OUR SEXUALITY 51–53
(2010).
77
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disparately by these mainstream corporations because one is legally
and culturally acceptable while the other is not, even though the
constitutive sex acts may be identical. In both cases people are paid to
have sex for the benefit of others, but pornography can be
commoditized and consumed at a remote distance from the human
bodies used in its production. Intellectual property laws play integral
roles in this commoditization, offering to the creators and distributors
of pornography the branding opportunities facilitated by trademarks
and the incentives, legal protections, and artistic legitimacy associated
84
with copyrights.
II
THE COPYRIGHT ACT AND CONTENT-BASED REGULATION OF
EXPRESSIVE SPEECH
Copyright law is even more pornography-friendly than the First
Amendment. The First Amendment will only protect pornography if it
is not obscene or illegal for other reasons; for example, if it contains
depictions of children. Copyright law offers protections to
pornography no matter what material it contains.85 The First
Amendment merely prevents the government from interfering in the
creation, distribution and consumption of pornography that is not
obscene or otherwise illegal. Copyright law actually incentivizes the
creation and distribution of pornography and enables pornographers
to employ government resources to prevent and punish infringing
uses by government actors and private parties alike.
When an adequately original work is fixed in a tangible medium of
expression, it is a copyrighted commodity that can be bought or sold,
licensed or traded.86 This is why even though copyright law facilitates
the production and distribution of free speech in the form of fine art,
literature, music, and drama, the Copyright Act, as written and
interpreted, often manifests as a particularized form of commercial

84 See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare
Not Speak Its Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 795, 799 (discussing role of copyright in creating
branding opportunities).
85 See, e.g., Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th
Cir. 1979) (“[P]rotection of all writings, without regard to their content, is a
constitutionally permissible means of promoting science and the useful arts.”).
86 See generally Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006) (setting out the
requirements for copyright protection and regulating the many ways a copyrighted work
can be exploited).
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law.
The relationship between the First Amendment and
pornography is often characterized as freedom of speech, while the
relationship between the Copyright Act and pornography is mostly, if
not exclusively, about money. Pornography is no different than any
other creative work in that regard.
Originality, the essential requirement of copyrightability, is
assessed in a content-specific manner, and the level of originality
required to trigger copyright protection, both doctrinally and in
88
practice, is low. As long as a work exhibits some improvement upon
preexisting materials, the copyright holder can defend its unique
creative aspects from unauthorized copying, subject to constraints
such as fair use.89 The copyright holder owns the work’s words and
images, not in an absolute manner as one might own real estate or
chattels, but in a copyright sense. Anybody who wants to use the
work substantively without potentially triggering an infringement suit
needs to ask the copyright holder’s permission and pay her for the
privilege; thus, the exchange requires an offer, acceptance, capacity,
and consideration—the elements of a valid contract. The copyright
holder is generally free to withhold permission, which freights any
unauthorized use of her words or images with the threat of legal
action in response.
Copyright protections facilitate governmentally promulgated
regulation of speech in ways one unfamiliar with contemporary
copyright jurisprudence might understandably but incorrectly assume
that the First Amendment did not allow. Copyright law establishes a
legal framework for injunctions that chill and censor speech if the
content of the speech infringes or potentially infringes a copyright,
and damages awards that punish speakers who use copyrighted words,
or words that are deemed too similar to copyrighted words. Despite
this, First Amendment grounded objections to copyright-based

87 Copyright law has been treated more like commerce than speech by the Supreme
Court. See Ruth L. Okediji, Through the Years: The Supreme Court and the Copyright
Clause, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1633 (2004), available at http://www.wmitchell.edu
/lawreview/Volume30/Issue5/3Okediji.pdf.
88 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991); see also
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); cf. Bridgeman Art Libr.,
Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
89 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (explaining fair
use inquiry focus is whether and to what extent the allegedly offending work is
“transformative” and alters original work with new expression).
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censorship have not found much traction in the courts. In Harper &
Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court explicitly
held that there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted
91
works of others, not even in small excerpted increments. Attempts
to communicate uncopyrightable facts or ideas using alternative
words or images can also be enjoined if these words or images are
92
deemed substantially similar to copyright-protected expression.
Some courts and commentators perpetuate a facile trope about
copyright law being nondiscriminatory with respect to content
because copyright law can protect any kind of content that is
adequately original and fixed in a tangible medium of expression.93
But nothing about copyrights is content neutral.
The Supreme Court may occasionally deploy the power of fair use
to prevent copyright protections from trumping the First
Amendment,94 but at most, fair use unambiguously carves out only
limited and highly contextual speech rights with respect to contested
95
words or images, and even those may only be available after
expensive and protracted litigation. The late Justice William
Rehnquist noted in his dissent in a flag burning case in 1974 that
96
copyright law is an example of a constitutional speech restriction.
One scholarly take on his views is that “Copyright law restricts
speech: It restricts you from writing, singing, painting, or otherwise
communicating what you please. If your speech copies ours, and if
the copying uses our ‘expression,’ not merely our ideas or facts, it can
97
be enjoined and punished, civilly and sometimes criminally.” A

90 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998).
91 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
92 See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.
1986) (holding jeans maker enjoined from using stitching pattern substantially similar to
those on the back of Levi’s jeans).
93 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What
Copyright Has in Common With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000).
94 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994).
95 Id. (“This is not, of course, to say that anyone who calls himself a parodist can skim
the cream and get away scot free. In parody, as in news reporting . . . context is everything,
and the question of fairness asks what else the parodist did besides go to the heart of the
original.”).
96 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 417 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97 Lemly & Volokh, supra note 90, at 165-66 (citing Spence, 418 U.S. at 417)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
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little over a decade later a Supreme Court majority illustrated this
point by holding in Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises
that fair use would not necessarily give a journalist the right to use
brief verbatim quotes from the memoirs of a public figure in a news
story.98
Through the Copyright Office and the courts, the federal
government already makes content-based decisions about the
copyright worthiness of creative works. Some works are deemed
99
inadequately creative to warrant copyright protection. Others may
be treated as uncopyrightable because they contain infringing
material.100 The artistic merit of a creative work is not supposed to
drive administrative or judicial decisions about either copyrightability
or the robustness of the scope of the copyright with which a work is
vested.101 Lousy songs, awful novels, and ugly paintings get just as
much copyright protection as fine melodies, riveting sagas, and
beautiful pictures. Boring or inane works are accorded the same level
of copyright protection that gripping and insightful ones receive.
Political speech gets no more or less copyright protection than any
other sort of speech. All this gives copyright law a thin veneer of
content neutrality in the First Amendment sense, but that does not
102
survive sustained analytical scrutiny.
Both obscenity laws and
copyright laws are content-based restrictions on speech.103 Copyright
laws facilitate speech regulation by the government that takes the
form of refereeing business transactions and adjudicating commercial
disputes. In consequence, First Amendment considerations are often

98 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985) (finding
no fair use by The Nation magazine where thirteen percent of article quotes original
language from unpublished manuscript).
99 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Brandir Int’l,
Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber, Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987); John Muller & Co. v.
N.Y. Arrows Soccer Team, Inc., 802 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1986).
100 See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983); Anderson v. Stallone,
11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
101 See, e.g., Copyright and Fair Use Overview: Copyright Basics FAQ, STANFORD U.
LIBRS. & ACADEMIC INFO. RES., http://fairuse.stanford.edu/Copyright_and_Fair_Use
_Overview/chapter0/0-a.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (“It doesn’t matter if an author’s
creation is similar to existing works, or even if it is arguably lacking in quality, ingenuity
or aesthetic merit. So long as the author toils without copying from someone else, the
results are protected by copyright.”).
102 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Essay, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 891, 897 (2002).
103 See id. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 93.
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104

minimized.
Because copyright protection grants the copyright
holder an exclusive right to specific forms of expression only, it does
not, according to the Supreme Court, inherently impermissibly restrict
105
106
free speech. But restrict free speech it can. In this author’s view,
the effects of copyright laws are inadequately appreciated by
mainstream media consumers. The First Amendment may be
interpreted to confer a right to possess a particular work of
pornography, but if someone’s copy is unauthorized, copyright laws
may render that possession criminal. Illegal downloading is a form of
socially deviant speech that pornographers themselves condemn and
seek to arrest and eradicate when they enforce their copyrights.
A copyright holder’s control over a work is not unqualified.
Portions of otherwise copyrighted creative works are
noncommoditizable through copyright for a host of policy reasons.107
A copyright holder cannot monopolize facts or ideas, as doing so
would disadvantage competitors and unduly discourage the creation
of new works without sufficient compensatory benefits to society. 108
That may sound like a fairly straightforward limitation, but defining
facts and ideas and coherently extricating them from the sticky grasp
of copyrightable expression can be difficult.109
Ambiguous conflations of facts, ideas, and putatively protectable
expression may float outside the confines of copyright control
through the merger and scènes à faire doctrines, which are supposed
to prevent certain kinds of overreaching by copyright holders.110 But

104 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985).
105 E.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (holding that “extension of
existing and future copyrights does not violate the First Amendment”).
106 See, e.g., Rob Beshizza, DMCA Used To Try And Silence Movie Reviewer, WIRED
(Jan. 14, 2008, 4:57 AM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2008/01/dmca-used-to-tr/;
Rashmi Rangnath, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Uses the DMCA to Silence Critic, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/2721.
107 See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1130 (1990).
108 See, e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR., A Unified Theory of
Copyright, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 215, 321–41 (2009).
109 See Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992); see generally
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001).
110 See Ginsburg, supra note 109; see also Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality,
and the End of the Scénes à Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L.
REV. 779, 781–83 (2006) (explaining no copyright protection is available “if an idea and
the expression of the idea are so tied together that the idea and its expression are one”).

BARTOW

24

10/4/2012 2:20 PM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91, 1

there are no guarantees. Some words and images can be controlled
through copyright law, but others cannot.111 How much power a
copyright holder wields is not known until a judge or jury rules. The
scope of copyright protection is uncertain. Unauthorized uses are
adjudicated individually and similar appropriations could drive
different outcomes. In an infringement suit, a court makes highly
content-specific determinations about which elements of a plaintiff’s
work fit in the protected category and which do not, which
unauthorized uses are fair and which are not, and when something
facially different from protected expression such as a paraphrase is
still too similar and can therefore be enjoined.112 Paraphrasing could
constitute an infringement, while literal copying might be fair use.
Uncertainty reigns.
Simply sending a “takedown” notice under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) is a powerful non-content-neutral tool
developed and backed by the federal government that a copyright
holder can use to pressure an online content provider to remove
113
expressive speech from an online venue. The incentives to comply
with a takedown notice are powerful, and counterincentives are
virtually nonexistent.114 The parry and thrust of the DMCA notice
and takedown regime look a lot like, if not the prior restraint of
speech, then at least almost contemporaneous silencing. Expressive
speech is removed from a website in prudent response to
representations about the copyrighted nature of its content. Silencing
the speaker carries no risk to the silencer, but failing to silence the
speaker renders an Internet service provider potentially liable for the
illegal actions of third parties.115 The incentives all weigh in favor of

111

Murray, supra note 110, at 790–91.
Id.
113 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998:
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY, 11–13 (1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov
/legislation/dmca.pdf.
114 See Kurt Opsahl, YouTube Wins Summary Judgment in Viacom DMCA Lawsuit,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 23, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/06/youtube
-wins-summary-judgment-viacom-dmca (“The DMCA safe harbors give service providers
like YouTube a strong incentive to remove content upon receipt of a takedown notice
(Viacom sent 100,000 notices to YouTube in one day; virtually all the videos were gone
by the next business day). In exchange, those service providers are shielded from
copyright infringement liability.”).
115 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) broadly
immunizes Internet service providers from civil liability based on claims related to
content. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1998).
112
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takedown but this does not, according to any court that has yet
considered the question, rise to the level of censorship that implicates
the First Amendment.116
The Copyright Act already regulates speech in myriad ways that
are obviously not content neutral. Denying copyright protection to
harmful pornographic works would not additionally burden lawful
speech in a manner that violates the First Amendment. Rather, it
would simply reduce the government-provided incentives for the
production and distribution of harmful pornography.
III
WHAT IS “NON-PROGRESSIVE” AND “NON-USEFUL” PORNOGRAPHY?
A. Pornography as Cultural Construct
The difference in social status between men and women is both
illustrated and reinforced by endemic highly sexualized depictions of
women in the media. At the far end of a very long and dense
continuum is hardcore pornography. As Catharine MacKinnon has
eloquently explained, pornography reflects and reinforces the unequal
117
and inferior position of women. Pornography has an impact on the
media that is visible in advertisements for products that are not related
to sex. Consider three illustrative examples. An ad for Arby’s
positioned two round meat sandwiches in the place of breasts with a
disembodied woman’s arms crossed over the burger-chest.118 Old
Spice exhorts potential customers to “Keep it Clean,” next to an
unsubtle picture of a woman suggestively licking an ice cream cone,
as if performing fellatio, with the text, “She is only eating it because it
119
tastes good and it is hot where she happens to be.”
An
advertisement for a Clinique skin moisturizer uses a common visual

116 See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); James Boyle, The
First Amendment and Cyberspace: The Clinton Years, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 337
(2000); Robert Kasunic, Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 397 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law,
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529 (2000).
117 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).
118 See Darren Rovell, Arby’s Scores in Swimsuit Issue, CNBC (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/29139052 (describing the ad that appeared in the 2009 Sports
Illustrated Swimsuit Edition).
119 See CARMINE SARRACINO & KEVIN M. SCOTT, THE PORNING OF AMERICA 120
(2008).
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pornography trope with fluid splattered on a woman’s face.
The
cultural effects of pornography are felt by everyone. 121 But it is the
people who sell sex directly who are most deeply marginalized. Most
of the people working as prostitutes or in pornography are doing so
because they are subject to some form of coercion—actual or
threatened violence and intimidation or financial coercion.122 A poor
economic climate has driven more people into prostitution and

120

See id. at 118.
See Ana J. Bridges, Pornography’s Effects on Interpersonal Relationships
(unpublished research paper, Dep’t. of Psychol., University of Arkansas), available at
http://www.socialcostsofpornography.org/Bridges_Pornographys_Effect_on_Interpersonal
_Relationships.pdf; Ryan Singel, Internet Porn: Worse Than Crack?, WIRED (Nov. 19,
2004), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2004/11/65772; cf. David Lee,
What is the Influence of Pornography on Rape?, CALCASA (Mar. 19, 2010),
http://calcasa.org/prevention/what-is-the-influence-of-pornography-on-rape/ (detailing two
research papers that reach opposite conclusions about the effect of pornography on the rate
of sexual assaults).
122 See Melissa Farley, Prostitution, Trafficking, and Cultural Amnesia: What We Must
Not Know in Order to Keep the Business of Sexual Exploitation Running Smoothly, 18
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 109, 134 (2006) (“We found that prostitution was multitraumatic:
71% [of prostitutes interviewed in multi-national study] were physically assaulted in
prostitution; 63% were raped; 89% . . . wanted to escape prostitution, but did not have
other options for survival”); Dorchen Leidholdt, Prostitution: A Violation of Women’s
Human Rights, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 136 (1993) (“[P]rostitution . . . isn’t about
choice. Instead, prostitution is about the absence of meaningful choices . . . .”); Catharine
A. Mackinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER AND L. 13 (1993),
available at http://www.prostitutionresearch.com/mackinnon2.html; Melissa Farley,
Human Trafficking and Prostitution, http://www.prostitutionresearch.com/faq/000175
.html (“The conditions that make genuine consent possible are absent from prostitution:
physical safety, equal power with johns and pimps, and real alternatives”); Prostitution
FAQ, Human Trafficking and Prostitution, PROSTITUTION GENDERBERG, http://www
.genderberg.com/phpNuke/modules.php?name=FAQ&myfaq=yes&id_cat=2&categories
=Prostitution+FAQf (last visited Aug. 20, 2012). Max Waltman, Stockholm Univ. Dep’t
of Psychology, Paper to Be Presented at the Swedish Political Science Ass’n (SWEPSA)
Annual Meeting, Sept. 30 to Oct. 2, 2010: RETHINKING DEMOCRACY: Legal
Challenges to Pornography and Sex Inequality in Canada, Sweden, and the United States,
available at http://www.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1315/1315857_waltman.pdf (“Although
some question that pornography is produced under such coercive or violent conditions as
those documented in this sample, a significant body of evidence below unfortunately
shows this study was not an exception. Rather, violence, force, and coercive circumstances
seem endemic in its production which, considering among other things the gender
inequality in its consumption, suggest that it is strongly related to male social
dominance.”). Cf. Chuck Neubauer, Most Human Trafficking Related to Prostitution,
WASH. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/28/most
-human-trafficking-related-to-prostitution/ (discussing a report by the U.S. Department of
Justice stating that most human trafficking involves prostitution).
121
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pornography because alternative avenues of employment have
declined, and most of these people are women.123
Johns, pimps, and prostitutes are all committing crimes in most
jurisdictions of the United States, but prostitutes are
disproportionately targeted for arrest by law enforcement officials. 124
Despite a few high profile exceptions, most johns are ignored or even
protected by social norms that favor punishing and shaming
prostitutes.125
As explained previously, when a camera is brought into a room in
which a commercial sex transaction is occurring, what was illegal
prostitution suddenly becomes pornography, which is generally legal
if all parties are eighteen or older, and which is protected under the
auspices of dominant First Amendment jurisprudence.126
Pornographers are much less likely than pimps to be arrested for
arranging monetized sex acts, and are subject to far less governmental
supervision or scrutiny than anyone involved in the production of
127
mainstream movies or television programs. Pornographers enjoy a
broad zone of autonomous anonymity, while at the same time the
distribution of pornography strips the performers they film of visual
and informational privacy, both legally and as a practical matter. The
performers’ real names may be kept on record so that government
actors can insure they are legally adults,128 and their faces and bodies
129
may remain in Internet circulation in perpetuity.

123 See Kristi Jourdan, Ex-Prostitutes Walk Tough Road to Economic Freedom Amid
Recession, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 24, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.lvrj.com/news/ex
-prostitutes-walk-tough-road-to-economic-freedom-amid-recession-82543682.html (last
updated April 10, 2012, 10:44 AM); For 4, Life of Prostitution and Death by 1 Killer,
CBS N.Y. (Jan. 29, 2011, 10:01 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/01/29/for-4-life
-of-prostitution-and-death-by-1-killer/.
124 See Melissa Farley et al., Prostitution and Trafficking in Nine Countries: An Update
on Violence and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 2 J. TRAUMA PRAC. 33 (2003), available
at http://www.prostitutionresearch.com/pdf/Prostitutionin9Countries.pdf.
125 See infra notes 144–51 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (discussing the Freeman case).
127 See Donna M. Hughes, The Demand for Victims of Sex Trafficking (June 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/demand
_for_victims.pdf; Max Waltman, Stockholm Univ. Dep’t of Psychology, Midwest Political
Science Association Conference: The Ideological Obstacle: Charging Pornographers for
Sexual Exploitation (Apr. 11–15, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2050290.
128 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (2006). See generally Ann Bartow, Why Hollywood Does Not
Require “Saving” From the Recordkeeping Requirements Imposed by 18 U.S.C. Section
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While prostitution is badly policed by the government in ways that
disproportionately target women, pornography is barely regulated at
all. Consumer-oriented statements about animal welfare can be seen
130
on cans of tuna bearing “dolphin safe” labels,
or general release
movies that includes notices that that no animals were harmed during
the making of the film. In stark contrast, pornographic works are
often advertised in ways that highlight actual violence that was done
to performers during production, such as “bloody first times,”
“blondes getting slammed,” “big mutant dicks rip small chicks,” and
“men fucking that teen virgin bitch’s ass so hard she couldn’t sit for
days.”131 Apparently, this is an effective way to sell pornography to
average pornography consumers. One wonders how the same
audience would respond to cans of tuna bearing labels that said, “Now
with more brutally slaughtered dolphins than ever!” It may be that
pornography consumers falsely believe all pornography performances
are voluntary and consensual, but the violent sales pitches
compellingly suggest that it is more likely consumers derive extra
pleasure from the possibility of real women’s suffering.
Many works of mainstream pornography promote a dangerously
distorted vision of female sexual response. Many of these works are
produced in ways that endanger the health and safety of the
performers, with practices ranging from unprotected sex acts among
multiple partners in ways that are especially likely to facilitate the
spread of diseases, to heavy-handed, body-damaging, unsimulated
132
violence.
The U.S. Department of State’s June 2007 Trafficking in Persons
Report noted that trafficked women and children are the primary

2257, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 43, 43 (2008), available at http://yalelawjournal.org
/images/pdfs/701.pdf.
129 Once information is posted to the Internet, it is difficult, if not impossible, to remove
it. Jeffrey Rosen calls this the “infinite memory” of the web. Jeffrey Rosen, The Web
Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 25, 2010, at MM30, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
130 Dolphin Safe Tuna: Consumers, EARTH ISLAND INST., http://www.earthisland.org
/dolphinSafeTuna/consumer/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
131 A reader can verify this statement by entering these phrases into an Internet search
engine.
132 See Maria de Cesare, Rxxx: Resolving the Problem of Performer Health and Safety
in the Adult Film Industry, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 667, 684 (2006); Christina Jordan, The
XXX-Files: Cal/OSHA’s Regulatory Response to HIV in the Adult Film Industry, 12
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 421, 424 (2005).
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victims of commercial sexual exploitation. The Report emphasized
the commercial sexual exploitation that human trafficking makes
possible, decrying the forced prostitution of trafficked women and
children. The Report also references child pornography multiple
times, but the forced participation of women aged eighteen or over in
pornography is not mentioned at all. There is plenty of evidence that
women who are “prostituted” (to use the terminology of the Report)
are also force-filmed so that videos of their rapes can be distributed
commercially, but this category of sexual exploitation did not merit
mention by the State Department’s Report, though surely no one
believes that women held captive and forced into prostitution are
contemporaneously appearing in pornography voluntarily.
However, pornography is a very lucrative product for mainstream
American corporations134 that are unlikely to open brothels. They will
sell only copyrighted sex to their clients. Pornography is prostitution
sanitized by physical remoteness from the commoditized bodies and
by the independent contractors who provide companies like Google
and General Motors with plausible deniability when people are
harmed during its production.
Pornographic pictures and movies in which the humiliation of
women is the central theme, fusing sexual desire with cruelty, are
extremely common in the United States.135 One of the few large-scale
academic studies of pornography on the Internet, now over a dozen
years old, ascertained that women are used disproportionately to men
136
in violating ways, such as being subjected to bestiality.
The
aggressive, vitriolic, and highly personal backlash against this study
by libertarian organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation is
undoubtedly responsible for the paucity of interest in pornography

133 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2007), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82902.pdf.
134 See DINES, supra note 83; see also supra note 14.
135 See, e.g., THE PRICE OF PLEASURE: PORNOGRAPHY, SEXUALITY & RELATIONSHIPS
(Media Educ. Found. 2008).
136 Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Survey
of 917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million
Times By Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories,
83 GEO. L.J. 1849, 1898–1901 (1995); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Vindication and
Resistance: A Response to the Carnegie Mellon Study of Pornography in Cyberspace, 83
GEO. L.J. 1959, 1963 (1995).
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research.
Sociologist Diana Russell has also argued that
researchers avoid or downplay research that negatively characterizes
pornography for professional reasons because being pro-pornography
is a more lucrative career strategy than exposing the harms of
pornography.138 Linda Williams, an academic in film studies, has
stressed the need for more scholarly analysis of pornography139;
140
others have echoed this sentiment as well.
Given the pornography industry’s production of relentlessly sexist,
141
degrading, and racist photos, films, and websites, one might expect
politically liberal people to be receptive to critiques of pornography,
but one would be very wrong.142 Rather than open-minded
intellectual curiosity, criticisms of pornography are met with
accusations of prudery, censoriousness, and alignment with the

137 See Peter H. Lewis, The Internet Battles a Much-Disputed Study on Selling
Pornography Online, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1995, at D5, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/1995/07/17/business/tech-net-internet-battles-much-disputed-study-selling
-pornography-line.html; David Farber, IP: Martin Rimm and the Anti-Porn Activists –
From the EFFector, INTERESTING-PEOPLE (Oct. 20, 1995, 4:39 PM), http://www
.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/199510/msg00056.html.
138 Diana E. H. Russell, The Experts Cop Out, in MAKING VIOLENCE SEXY: FEMINIST
VIEWS ON PORNOGRAPHY 151 (Diana E. H. Russell ed., 1993).
139 Linda Williams, Porn Studies: Proliferating Pornographies On/Scene: An
Introduction, in PORN STUDIES 1 (Linda Williams ed., 2004).
140 See Hughes, supra note 127; Daniel Linz et al., Civil Liberties and Research on the
Effect of Pornography, in PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY (Peter Suedfeld & Philip E.
Tetlock eds., 1992), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/comm/malamuth/pdf/92PSP
_C10.pdf; Neil M. Malamuth & Victoria Billings, The Functions and Effects of
Pornography: Sexual Communications Versus the Feminist Models in Light of Research
Findings, in PERSPECTIVES ON MEDIA EFFECTS (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillmann eds.,
1986), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/comm/malamuth/pdf/86PME_C5.pdf.
141 See, e.g., Gail Dines, The White Man’s Burden: Gonzo Pornography and the
Construction of Black Masculinity, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 283 (2006); Gail Dines,
King Kong and the White Woman: Hustler Magazine and the Demonization of Black
Masculinity, 4 J. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 291 (1998), available at http://www
.hustlingtheleft.com/CRAPP_E_LIB/dines.html.
142 See, e.g., Danny Scoccia, Can Liberals Support a Ban on Violent Pornography?,
106 ETHICS 776 (July 1996); Gail Dines, How Some Men React When They Think You
Want to Take Away Their Porn: Penn, Porn and Me, COUNTERPUNCH (June 23, 2008),
http://www.counterpunch.org/dines06232008.html. But see The Price of Pleasure:
Pornography, Sexuality, and Relationships: Noam Chomsky on Pornography (Media
Educ. Found. 2008), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SNlRoaFTHuE; but
see also Robin Wilson, Tenured Professor is Placed on Leave After Showing a Film About
Pornography, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 20, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article
/Tenured-Professor-Is-Placed-on/131607/?key=Tmh6JAI7NyAXYSpnZjdBZDoAOiM
4YR17YH9Nbnl/blFQFA%3D%3D (reporting that a professor was punished for showing
The Price of Pleasure, which is very critical of pornography, to her sociology class).
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political right wing.
The liberal perspective seems to be that
feminists should not attack pornography because social
archconservatives attack pornography, and they cannot possibly have
144
the correct view of this (or any) issue.
But right-wing religious
fundamentalist cultural warriors do not evidence any particular
driving passion to regulate pornography. Pornography’s widespread
existence seems very useful to them culturally as a mechanism to
illustrate the depravity of liberals.145 It has been this author’s strong
impression that they rarely exhibit concern about the people damaged
during the production of pornography. Their agenda actually appears
to be very different: governmental regulation of sex and interpersonal
relationships; government-based persecution of homosexuals; legal
restrictions upon access to contraceptives and to instruments of sexual
pleasure, such as vibrators; and the re-illegalization of abortion.146
Principled expressions of concern about the harms of pornography
production from either the left or right are rare indeed.
In this author’s view, prostitution is also tolerated and normalized
within mainstream American society. But because prostitution is
generally illegal, the intersections between law and the people
involved with the industry are different, even though some women
147
who perform in pornography also sell sex directly to consumers

143 See, e.g., Robert Jensen, A Call for an Open Discussion of Mass-Marketed
Pornography, ALTERNET (Feb. 10, 2007), http://www.alternet.org/media/47677?page
=entire.
144 See, e.g., Nina Hartley, Thus I Refute Chyng Sun: Feminists for Porn,
COUNTERPUNCH (Feb. 2, 2005), http://www.counterpunch.org/hartley02022005.html (“If
I have the right to choose abortion, then I have the right to choose to have sex for the
camera. Sexual freedom is the flip side of the coin of reproductive choice.”).
145 See, e.g., Whitney Strub, Perversion for Profit: Citizens for Decent Literature and
the Arousal of an Antiporn Public in the 1960s, 15 J. HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 258 (2006),
available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_the_history_of_sexuality/v015/15.2
strub.html; see also Austin Cline, Christian Attitudes Towards Sex, Pornography,
ABOUT.COM (Oct. 20, 2009), http://atheism.about.com/b/2009/10/20/christian-attitudes
-towards-sex-pornography.htm; Green Point, Hotel Porn Gets Spanking From Religious
Right: Conservatives Push Marriott to Drop Pay-Per-View Sex Flicks, NEWSER (July 23,
2008, 9:20 PM), http://www.newser.com/story/33072/hotel-porn-gets-spanking-from
-religious-right.html.
146 See generally CULTURE WARS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISSUES, VIEWPOINTS, AND
VOICES (Roger Chapman ed., 2009).
147 JoAnna, Prostitution in Las Vegas, WHYGO LAS VEGAS, http://www.lasvegaslogue
.com/prostitution (“Former and current porn stars sometimes base themselves at the
brothels for a week or two at a time, and they can charge $1,000 or more.”) (last visited
July 4, 2012).
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and many johns are probably also pornography users. The threat of
arrest or exposure impacts both the providers and consumers of
commoditized sex. Men who are exposed as patrons of prostitutes
149
(such as former New York Governor Elliot Spitzer
and former
150
Dean of the Villanova School of Law Mark Sargent) are publicly
shamed, but the impact of this may be only temporary. Spitzer
resigned as Governor of New York, but is now enjoying a highprofile media career.151 Sargent resigned his Deanship, but he
avoided criminal charges by helping the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania send the women who had sexually serviced him to
jail.152
Women culturally identified as prostitutes are also publicly
shamed,153 but arguably that is the least of their problems. They are
arrested and jailed at much higher rates than male pimps or johns and
154
are extremely vulnerable to violence and coercion.
Due to the

148 See Richard Tewksbury & Seana Golder, Why Do Johns Use Pornography?
Predicting Consumption of Pornography by Clients of Street Level Prostitutes, 2
SOUTHWEST J. CRIM. L. 101 (2005), available at http://swacj.org/swjcj/archives
/2.2/Tewksbury.pdf ; Leslie Bennetts, The John Next Door, NEWSWEEK (July 18, 2011,
1:00 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/07/17/the-growing-demand-for
-prostitution.html;
149 See Emperors Club: All About Eliot Spitzer’s Alleged Prostitution Ring,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 18, 2008, 11:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/03
/10/emperors-club-all-about-e_n_90768.html (last updated May 25, 2011, 1:25 PM).
150 See Jeff Blumenthal, Villanova Dean Resigned Over Prostitution, PHILADELPHIA
BUS. J. (July 7, 2009, 11:36 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/blogs/law
/2009/07/villanova_dean_resigned_over_prostitution.html?surround=etf (last modified
Oct. 16, 2010, 3:40 AM); Gina Passarella, Questions Arise After Law School Dean’s
Resignation in Wake of Prostitution Investigation, LAW.COM (July 7, 2009),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432042292&src=EMC-Email&et=editorial
&bu=Law.com&pt=LAWCOM%20Newswire&cn=NW_20090707&kw=Questions%20
Arise%20After%20Law%20School%20Dean%27s%20Resignation%20in%20Wake%20
of%20Prostitution%20Investigation&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
151 See Jan Hoffman, Spitzer’s Long Road to Redemption, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, at
E1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/fashion/08Spitzer.html?_r=1
&adxnnl=1&ref=style&adxnnlx=1298045180-PTPxe9qf1azDCzdD5bLdQQ;
Brian
Montopoli, Elliot Spitzer Gets Primetime CNN Show, CBS NEWS (June 23, 2010, 11:29
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20008567-503544.html.
152 See Kathleen BradyShea, Ex-Dean Helped Police, Report Says, PHILLY.COM (July
03, 2009), http://articles.philly.com/2009-07-03/news/25288787_1_sargent-prostitution
-ring-customer.
153 See Katie Escherich, Ashley Dupré: ‘I’ve Made So Many Mistakes’, ABC NEWS
(Nov. 21, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=6302149&page=1.
154 See Gene Johnson, New Murder Charge Filed in Seattle in Green River Killings;
Ridgway Won’t Face Death Penalty, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 7, 2011),

BARTOW

2012]

10/4/2012 2:20 PM

Copyright Law and Pornography

33

illegality of their livelihood, they cannot expect protection from
police officers, and instead are often exploited by them.155
But there is little reason to believe that wholesale legalization of
prostitution would improve the lives of women who sell sex. The fact
that pornography production is legal does not mean that performing in
156
pornography is safe; quite the contrary, as is explained below.
In
countries such as the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Finland, Greece, Israel, Mexico, Singapore,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom where prostitution is legal,
women working legally as prostitutes157 still suffer from high rates of
violence and substance abuse.158 In addition, high rates of demand
combined with greed foster sex trafficking and a giant and extremely
lucrative illegal prostitution trade carried on outside the strictures of
government regulations within these jurisdictions.159 Women infected
with HIV cannot work legally as prostitutes, but they still have bodies
that men are willing to buy. Women who sell sex legally in brothels
that actually care about their health and well-being may not have to
submit to unprotected sex, or to sex acts they find distasteful or
worse, but the customers making these demands can simply go to
other “providers”; those without any power or options at all.

http://www.startribune.com/templates/Print_This_Story?sid=115501659 (reporting how a
serial killer “preyed upon women and girls at the margins of society—runaways,
prostitutes and drug addicts”).
155 See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Empirical Analysis of
Street-Level Prostitution (2008), available at http://economics.uchicago.edu/pdf
/Prostitution%205.pdf.
156 See infra Part III.B.4.
157 100 Countries and Their Prostitution Policies, PROCON.ORG, http://prostitution
.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000772 (last updated Dec. 12, 2011, 10:26
AM).
158 E.g., Kimberly Schupp, Another Craigslist Killer? Bodies of 4 Women ID’ed,
WISTV.COM (Jan. 25, 2011, 8:14 AM), http://www.wistv.com/Global/story.asp?S
=13903767 (last updated Feb. 22, 2011, 8:41 AM); see also M.L. Burnette et al.,
Prevalence and Health Correlates of Prostitution Among Patients Entering Treatment for
Substance Use Disorders, 65 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337 (Mar. 2008), available at
http://archpsyc.jamanetwork.com/data/Journals/PSYCH/11858/yoa70078_337_344.pdf.
159 See Kevin Bales, Because She Looks Like a Child, in GLOBAL WOMAN: NANNIES,
MAIDS, AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 207, 226–28 (Barbara Ehrenreich &
Arlie Russell Hochschild eds., 2002) (noting that the exportation of enslaved prostitutes is
a robust business in Thailand, supplying brothels in Japan, Europe (mentioning
Switzerland and Germany particularly) and America); SHEILA JEFFREYS, THE INDUSTRIAL
VAGINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GLOBAL SEX TRADE 152, 173 (2009).
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Pornography and prostitution are cruelly symbiotic. One drives
demand for the other, and there is little practical difference between
prostitution and performing in pornography. In pornography a
director or pornographer is in control of the sex; in prostitution a
client or john is, and often a pimp as well. Addressing the harms that
are inflicted on even voluntary performers involved in the
manufacturing of pornography justifies regulating the production of
pornography. It does not require censorship of content except to the
extent necessary to reduce disease transmission and the infliction of
other physical injuries. Nonpornographic audiovisual works are
generally created subject to the costs and logistical constraints
imposed by industry norms, regulations, and legislation that establish
minimum levels of health and safety considerations accorded
performers and stunt people.160 Simply leaving them subject to the
base line negligence avoidance incentives and injury compensation
161
frameworks provided by tort law was deemed inadequate.
Pornography performers should receive the same level of concern and
protection, as they are no less worthy and no less human.
B. Toward a Content-Based Focus on the Constitutionality of
Copyright Protecting Individual Works of Pornography
Article I of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to promote
only the progress of science and useful arts through copyright
legislation.162 Congress itself has never specifically taken up the issue

160 See Nikki Finke, Feds Fine ‘Spider-Man – Broadway’ Production Company For
Cast Injuries, DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (Mar. 4, 2011, 6:09 PM), http://www.deadline.com
/2011/03/feds-fine-spider-man-broadway-production-company-for-cast-injuries/;
Karen
Idelson, High Stakes in Flying Game: Tech Tussle: Aerial Stunt Pros Stand Up for Safety,
VARIETY (Mar. 9, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118033594; Ann
Oldenburg, Still Willing to Take the Fall, USA TODAY (June 6, 2003, 1:42 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/news/2003-06-05-stunt_x.htm.
161 See, e.g., Safety Bulletins: Recommended by Industry-Wide Labor-Management
Safety Committee for the Motion Picture and Television Industry, CSATF,
http://www.csatf.org/bulletintro.shtml (last visited July 4, 2012); Michael McCann, Stunt
Injuries and Fatalities Increasing, available at http://www.uic.edu/sph/glakes
/harts1/HARTS_library/stunts.txt (last visited July 4, 2012) (providing this and other
articles on stunt safety). But see Joan Whitley, OSHA Not Reviewing Death of Stagehand,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 27, 2011; 7:36 AM), available at http://www.lvrj.com/news
/osha-not-reviewing-death-of-stagehand-114707049.html.
162 Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power “To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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of whether a creative work, otherwise eligible for copyright
protection, might be denied as a consequence of the work’s lack of
progressiveness or usefulness. Nor has it addressed the
163
copyrightability of pornography.
Before 1979, pornographers did not attempt to reap the benefits of
the Copyright Act. Copying and attribution norms were driven by the
business practices of organized crime.164 Then in Mitchell Brothers
Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, the Fifth Circuit held that
obscenity was not a defense to copyright infringement because
nothing in the Copyright Act of 1909 precluded the copyrighting of
obscene materials.165 The Fifth Circuit specifically used the term
“obscenity” rather than “pornography,” and concluded that holding
obscene materials copyrightable furthered the pro-creativity purposes
of the Copyright Act and of congressional copyright power
166
generally.
The Mitchell Brothers court also asserted that the First Amendment
and copyright are “mutually supportive,” writing: “The financial
incentive provided by copyright encourages the development and
exchange of ideas which furthers the first amendment’s purpose of
167
promoting the ‘exposition of ideas.’”
The article quoted by the
court linked this to a right to reach an audience or readership that is
economically facilitated by copyright protections.168
The Mitchell Brothers court expressed enthusiastic support for
increasing incentives for the production and distribution of
pornography without expressing concern for any negative
consequences. In the years following the Mitchell Brothers decision,
courts agonized over the costs and benefits of extending copyright
protections to categories of works such as computer game

163

See Bartow, supra note 14, at 833–35.
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON
PORNOGRAPHY, ORGANIZED CRIME INVOLVEMENT IN PORNOGRAPHY pt. 4, ch. 4 (1986),
available at http://www.porn-report.com/404-organized-crime-and-pornography.htm;
Mitchell Brothers, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitchell_brothers (last visited
July 4, 2012).
165 604 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that the now superseded Copyright Act of
1909 was the applicable statute).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 857 n.8 (quoting The First Amendment Exception to Copyright: A Proposed
Test, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 1158, 1177–78 (1977) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))).
168 Id.
164

BARTOW

10/4/2012 2:20 PM

36

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91, 1

169

interfaces, where any harm from an overly expansive construction
of copyright was likely to be strictly economic in nature. Pornography
apparently presented a much easier case.
Three years later, in Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, the Ninth Circuit
adopted the Mitchell Brothers court’s reasoning unquestioningly,
relying on an endorsement by Nimmer on Copyright, which it referred
to as “[t]he leading treatise on copyright.”170 Although Mitchell
Brothers was the only case on point at that time, the Jartech court
observed that “Nimmer also considers Mitchell Brothers to represent
the prevailing view on this issue,”171 and followed the prescriptions
of the copyright treatise by rote.172
In 2002, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., a federal
judge stated that the protection of pornographic copyrights was
173
“consistent with the public interest.”
In 2004, in Nova Products,
Inc. v. Kisma Video, Inc., a third court decided to follow Mitchell
Brothers, observing:
In its well-reasoned and scholarly opinion, the Fifth Circuit [in
Mitchell Brothers] reviewed the history of the copyright legislation
and found that all-inclusive language of the Copyright Act of 1909,
17 U.S.C. § 34 (1970) (repealed), which encompassed “all the
writings of an author,”
did not bespeak of an obscenity exception to
174
copyright protection.

The author of Nimmer on Copyright, David Nimmer, appears to
view the issue of the copyrightability of pornography as somewhat of
a joke, having written a mocking fictional account of a debate over
the issue set in the year 2016.175 Yet courts are not in complete

169 See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir.
1992); Capcom U.S.A., Inc. v. Data East Corp., No. C 93-3259 WHO, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5306 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 1994); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 547 F. Supp.
999 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
170 666 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1982).
171 Id.
172 See generally Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 581 (2004) (offering a critique of courts’ over-reliance on the Nimmer treatise).
173 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1165 (C.D. Cal.
2002).
174 Nova Prods., Inc. v. Kisma Video, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 3850 (HB), 02 Civ. 6277 (HB),
03 Civ. 3379 (HB), 03 Civ. 4259 (HB), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24171, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 30, 2004).
175 David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Law Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233,
1282 (2004) (providing analysis of fictive “The Gazette Memmilania, Gm.; Jan. 14,
2018”); cf. DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT: SACRED TEXT, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE DMCA
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accord on this matter. In 1998, Judge Martin of the Southern District
of New York refused to grant a copyright infringement-grounded
preliminary injunction or pretrial impoundment and seizure order for
176
movies he believed to be obscene. He concluded that, “[g]iven the
clearly criminal nature of plaintiff’s operations, it is self-evident that
the Court should not use its equitable power to come to plaintiff’s
assistance,” and he refused to commit the resources of the U.S.
Marshals Service “to support the operation of plaintiff’s pornography
business.”177 The holding reflected an assumption that obscene works
were not eligible for copyright protection in the interval between
1790, when the first U.S. copyright law took effect, until almost two
178
hundred years later, when the Mitchell Brothers case was decided.
1. Defining and Promoting Progress
Legal scholars have debated the meanings of various textual
components of the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S.
Constitution quite vigorously.179 Many older cases talk about
“promot[ing] the Progress of . . . the useful Arts” in connection with
copyright, but the modern view is that the “Progress of the useful
Arts” refers to technology and therefore patents, while the part of the
clause relevant to copyrights is the part that invites Congress to
“promote the Progress of Science,” with science meaning
knowledge.180 This has the advantage of using the same order,
copyright then patent, in both halves of the clause.181

336–37 (2003) (arguing that online pornography is analogous to a peep show with a
legitimate claim to an admission price).
176 Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 177-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
177 Id. at 175.
178 The copyrightability of pornography is the subject of legal debate currently. See
Chris Matyszczyk, Copyright Defendant: Porn May Be, Um, Unprotected (Feb. 6, 2012,
5:42 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-57372240-71/copyright-defendant-porn
-may-be-um-unprotected/?part=rss&subj=latest-news&tag=title.
179 See Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress”
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing The
Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001).
180 See Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”: The
Copyright Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1,
7 (2002) (explaining the meaning of “science” as used in Constitution).
181 Thanks to Jessica Litman for this observation and framing of the issue.
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Non-progressive, non-useful works cannot constitutionally receive
copyright protection and the Copyright Act could be modified to
make this explicit. I propose the following definition:
A “non-progressive, non-useful” work is a pornographic work in
which the level of originality or creativity is low, but the likelihood
that harms were inflicted on living beings during the production of the
work, or the risk of harms resulting from distribution and
consumption of the work, is high.
Specific categories of works may be presumptively “nonprogressive” and “non-useful.” When the Supreme Court ruled in
Eldred v. Ashcroft in 2003 that the 1998 Copyright Term Extension
Act did not exceed constitutional boundaries with respect to the
“limited times” restraint upon Congressional copyright powers, it
signaled a high level of deference to Congress in the copyright
context.182 The Court reinforced this jurisprudential position when it
held that Congress could constitutionally restore copyright protection
183
to works that were in the public domain in Golan v. Holder. If the
proposed change to the Copyright Act was analyzed as an exercise of
power under the Copyright Clause, it could withstand constitutional
184
challenges
even though it might further fragment what little
coherence copyright law retains.185
As a practical matter of law and economics, this proposal rests
heavily upon the assumption that the benefits of reducing monetary
incentives for producing non-useful and non-progressive pornography
outweigh the additional costs inflicted upon those who have already
been harmed by corresponding incentives to increase the distribution
of existing works. Harms accrue to a person who has already been
abused in the production of pornography when that pornography is
distributed. More extensive distributional harm is inflicted when the

182 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188 (“The CTEA is a rational exercise of the
legislative authority conferred by the Copyright Clause. On this point, the Court defers
substantially to Congress. . . . The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically
makes, judgments the Court cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature’s domain.”).
183 Golan v. Holder, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/case
-files/cases/golan-v-holder/ (“Holding: Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act does not exceed Congress’s authority under the Copyright Clause.”).
184 Cf. Golan v. Holder, 609 F. 3d 1076, 1095 (2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600
(2011) (“In sum, Congress acted within its authority under the Copyright Clause in
enacting Section 514 . . . Section 514 does not violate plaintiffs’ freedom of speech under
the First Amendment because it advances an important governmental interest . . . .”).
185 See Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Law Comprehesibly, supra note 175.
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rate of distribution increases. If stripping certain pornographic works
of copyright protections causes their production to decline, but
demand remains the same, existing works become more valued and
will circulate more widely. People who have already been victimized
will thus bear some of the burden of reducing the number of future
victims. But the likelihood that they will be victimized further in the
production of new harmful works will also decline. In other words, a
smaller number of works would be circulated more widely, bringing
greater harms to the people traumatized by the distribution of those
works. But disincentivizing future harmful works would reduce the
total number of people subject to this abusive treatment overall. And
even the people injured by the circulation of existing works would
benefit if the production of new works further victimizing them were
derailed by a lack of economic incentives.
I expect the more virulent objections to this proposal to come from
people who call themselves liberal. One might expect left-identifying
observers to experience intense cognitive dissonance when speech
seems to inflict harms upon vulnerable people whom, as liberals, they
might actually care about in other contexts. But it is an instantiated
part of the liberal canon that the “worst” speech should receive the
most protection from the First Amendment, victims of the speech
notwithstanding. That the negative consequences of a vibrant First
Amendment fall more harshly upon women than men has made little
difference so far to most of the free speech theorists regarded as
important culturally or even within legal academia. There are,
however, some specific categories of pornography in which at least
some of the harms might be recognizable to even ardent libertarians:
child pornography, crush pornography, and revenge pornography.
Production of these works should not be incentivized or rewarded
with copyrights or the associative benefits. In addition, any
pornography in which the performers are engaged in unsimulated acts
that are coerced or compromise their health and safety should also be
denied copyright protections. I concede at the outset that establishing
the boundaries of these categories is vexingly complicated, but
important tasks are rarely easy.
2. Child Pornography
One hugely complicating variable with this category is the fact that
people have widely differing opinions about what constitutes child
pornography. Defining child pornography for purposes of eligibility
for copyright protection would be no harder than it is in the First
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Amendment milieu, but it might not be any easier or less contested
either. Audiovisual depictions of real children engaged in explicit sex
acts can be unambiguously described as child pornography. At the
other end of the continuum, however, are works like still photographs
of fully or mostly clothed teenagers who are posed in stances or
contexts that strike some observers as sexualized. The lines between
legal treatment of children as sex objects and illegal child
pornography can be blurry.186
The children depicted in pornography made with living performers
are generally treated as victims and the consumers of child
pornography as criminals, and rightly so. Pedophilia acted out in real
space poses serious dangers to children and should be discouraged by
every legal tool available, including exclusion from copyright
protections. This may be largely symbolic, as no holder of copyright
in a work that unambiguously constitutes child pornography has to
date legally asserted copyrights or brought an infringement action.187
Given the shadowy nature of the industry due to fear of arrest, it
seems unlikely that unambiguous works of child pornography in
which real children are depicted have even been registered with the
Copyright Office.188
Some observers argue that there is a moral panic about the
sexualization of children that manifests itself through hyperaggressive
prosecution of anyone associated with producing, distributing, or
consuming child pornography.189 Certainly the use of the age of the
subject as the single bright line that divides creative works with any
sort of sexual aspect into one of two stark categories: “acceptable”

186

See SARRACINO & SCOTT, supra note 119, at 20–29.
Based on the author’s extensive research. See also Court: Child Porn Victims Can
Get Restitution, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 1, 2012, 4:23 PM), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2012/10/01/us/ap-us-child-porn-paying-victims.html
?hp&_r=0. The possibility of restitution claims make it even less likely that an “author”
will assert copyright in child pornography.
188 Pornography using adults who look like children or computer generated children
may be registered, though its legality may be uncertain. See generally James Joyner,
Supreme Court Upholds Virtual Child Porn Law, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (May 19,
2008),
http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/supreme_court_upholds_virtual_child_porn
_law/; David Stout, Supreme Court Upholds Child Pornography Law, N.Y. TIMES (May
20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/20/washington/19cnd-scotus.html.
189 See Jesse P. Basbaum, Inequitable Sentencing for Possession of Child Pornography:
A Failure to Distinguish Voyeurs from Pederasts, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1281 (2010); Melissa
Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing: Empirical Validity or
Political Rhetoric?, 22 STANFORD L. & POL’Y REV. 545 (2011).
187
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and “profoundly unacceptable, and also disgusting and criminal” is
deeply problematic.190 As a definitional matter, drawing consistent
and principled lines about what does and does not constitute child
pornography is a daunting proposition in any context, copyright
eligibility most definitely included.
The average age of entry into both pornography and prostitution in
the United States is twelve years old.191 In sharp contrast to children
depicted in pornography, children who work as prostitutes are often
192
treated as criminals,
while the johns that patronize them are
prosecuted much less frequently.193 Sometimes the johns are
perceived by law enforcement actors as being victims of the seductive
wiles of the child prostitutes.194 The notion that commoditized sex
between children and adults is less damaging if it is not recorded by a
camera defies credulity. There may not be a lasting public record of
the event, but that does not undo acts of violence and victimization. It
may actually be less risky for men to actually rape prostituted
children than it is to possess photographs of other people raping
prostituted children. The ugly and profound disparity between the
ways child pornography and child prostitution are treated by the
criminal justice system severely undermines any claim that the zero
tolerance approach toward child pornography is aimed at protecting
children.195 But at least as a matter of rhetorical consistency,

190 MacKinnon, supra note 81, at 998 (“The majority of adults enter the industry as
children and are exploited in ways that do not disappear when they reach the age of
majority, including through materials in which children are used as women and women
infantilized as children.”).
191 Child Prostitution: Domestic Sex Trafficking of Minors, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/prostitution.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011); Sexual
Trafficking, WASH. ST. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., http://www.atg.wa.gov/Human
Trafficking/SexTrafficking.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
192 As Rebecca Tushnet astutely pointed out to me, the contrast blurs when girls are
prosecuted for “sexting,” sending pictures of themselves that fit the legal definition of
child pornography and then being arrested for it. See generally John A. Humbach,
‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433 (2010).
193 Tamar R. Birckhead, The “Youngest Profession”: Consent, Autonomy, and
Prostituted Children, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1075, 1103 (2011).
194 See MARY ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING AND POLICING
ADOLESCENT FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1885–1920 33 (1995)
(detailing how state legislators “assigned the image of female depravity to working-class
women, depicting working girls, servants, and prostitutes as licentious seducers of men”).
195 See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209,
213 (2001) (arguing that “[t]he growth of child pornography law has opened up a whole
arena for the elaborate exploration of children as sexual creatures”).
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declaring child pornography beyond the bounds of constitutional
copyright protection because it is not useful accomplishes something,
though admittedly it may be a very small advance indeed.
Finally, though it is well beyond the scope of this Article, some
hard questions need to be asked about why society seems to tolerate
196
child prostitution so much more readily than child pornography. A
child caught selling sex will often be arrested for it, despite clear
indicia that she has been coerced into it. People caught buying sex
from child prostitutes may only be punished lightly, or not at all, even
with evidence the child was forced into the situation.197 Yet if the
event is photographed, recorded on video, or filmed, the child is far
less likely to be arrested and has an improved likelihood of being
viewed and treated as a victim. Conterminously, people caught
viewing or possessing child pornography are often harshly punished
well beyond what might have befallen them had they had sexual
contact with the children themselves. The wrongs perpetrated against
child prostitutes are in many respects the same as those inflicted upon
children in pornography. All that is missing is fixation in a tangible
medium of expression and the copyright-protected commoditization
this facilitates. That having sex with children is treated as less illegal
and viewed as more socially acceptable than viewing images of other
people having sex with children is baffling and unjustifiable.
3. Crush Pornography
A federal statute formerly in effect provided that “[w]hoever
knowingly creates, sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty
with the intention of placing that depiction in interstate or foreign
commerce for commercial gain, shall be fined under this title or
198
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.” It was passed because

196 For a discussion of the statistics on prosecution of child sex offenders, see Mark
Motivans & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Federal Prosecution of Child Sex Exploitation Offenders,
2006, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL. 1, 1 (2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov
/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf (“During 2006, 3,661 suspects were referred to U.S.
attorneys for child sex exploitation offenses. Child pornography constituted 69% of
referrals, followed by sex abuse (16%) and sex transportation (14%).”) (emphasis added).
197 See Caroline Heldman, No Jail Time for Lawrence Taylor, MS. MAG. BLOG (Jan.
24, 2011), http://msmagazine.com/blog/blog/2011/01/24/no-jail-time-for-lawrence-taylor/
(discussing football linebacker Lawrence Taylor paying $300 to have sex with sixteenyear-old girl who had been given black eye and punched by her pimp before encounter).
198 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006), invalidated by United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577
(2010).
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while all individual states criminalize cruelty to animals, none has a
statute that prohibits the sale of depictions of cruelty to animals.199 So
distributors of “crush porn,” in which animals were tortured, could
not be effectively prosecuted because human participants could not be
identified if the faces of the women inflicting torture on animals in
crush porn were not shown, and neither the location of filming nor the
date of the activity was ascertainable by scrutinizing the pornography
itself. Defendants arrested for violating a state cruelty to animals
statute in connection with the production or sale of crush porn could
successfully assert as a defense that the state could not prove its
jurisdiction over the place where the acts occurred. Only if the people
involved in the production of the crush porn were caught in the act
could state anticruelty laws be invoked, and then only for the torture
itself, not for the production and sale of depictions of the same.
The Third Circuit held that this statute was an unconstitutional
infringement on the First Amendment right to free speech.200 The
court noted that there were already laws in all states against animal
cruelty, and the intent of Congress was to supplant those laws with a
law to prohibit the depiction of the cruelty. The Third Circuit rejected
the analogy made to laws prohibiting the depiction of child
pornography, finding that animals are not like children when it comes
to the First Amendment analysis because animals do not perceive the
injury of the depiction of the cruel act (as would a child) and thus the
injury is not in the depiction but in the cruel act (which is already
201
illegal under state statutes).
The ability to federalize the prosecution of animal cruelty cases
was effectively terminated when the Third Circuit ruling was affirmed
202
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Stevens.
However, the
Court held that since its enactment, the First Amendment has
permitted restrictions on categories of speech such as obscenity,
defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct
that “have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem,”

199 See generally State Animal Cruelty Laws, ASPCA, http://www.aspca.org/FightAnimal-Cruelty/Advocacy-Center/state-animal-cruelty-laws.aspx (last visited Jan. 3,
2012) (providing information on animal cruelty laws in each state).
200 United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 220 (3d Cir. 2008).
201 See id. at 230.
202 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010).
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but that depictions of animal cruelty should not be added to that
list.203
That the First Amendment precludes censoring speech that is
cruelly harmful or deadly to nonhuman animals does not mean that
the federal government has to supply copyright-based incentives for
it. Defining crush porn as non-useful and non-progressive could
discourage its production and distribution to the extent that it is
commercially distributed. And if it is constitutional and socially
desirable to criminally prosecute people such as Michael Vick for
cruelty to animals,204 surely it is appropriate to withhold governmentprovided copyright benefits from audiovisual recordings of activities
such as killing animals for sexual gratification.
4. “Revenge Porn”
“Revenge Porn” is pornography in which at least one of the
subjects was unaware that sexual acts were being fixed in a tangible
medium of expression or was unaware of or opposed to the work’s
205
distribution, usually over the Internet.
One object of its creation
and distribution is to encourage and facilitate the humiliation and
harassment of the victim subject. If one enters the words “revenge
porn” into an Internet search engine, both the popularity and the
profitability of the genre become immediately apparent.
Victims can be photographed or filmed by hidden cameras.206
Other times they may agree to be photographed or filmed but believe
207
the works will be kept private. Still other victims could be drugged

203

Id. at 1584–86 (quoting Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1941)).
See Apologetic Vick Gets 23-Month Sentence on Dogfighting Charges, ESPN,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3148549 (last updated Dec. 11, 2007)
(discussing the football star’s conviction and sentence for financially contributing to a
dogfighting enterprise).
205 See David Kluft, Revenge Porn: “Is Anyone Up” on Copyright Law?, TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT LAW BLOG (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.trademarkandcopyrightlawblog
.com/tags/dmca/.
206 See Aja Styles, School Bullying Revenge Attack Sees Boy Jailed for Child
Pornography, WA TODAY (July 26, 2011), http://www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/school
-bullying-revenge-attack-sees-boy-jailed-for-child-pornography-20110725-1hx9c.html.
207 See Adrian Chen, Meet the Hollywood Hackers Coming for Your Nude Pics,
GAWKER (Aug. 29, 2011, 8:21 PM), http://gawker.com/5835611/meet-the-hollywood
-hackers-coming-for-your-nude-pics; Marlene Naanes, Bad Breakup? Police Warn
Posting Photos of Ex-lovers Online for Revenge Can Lead to Jail, NORTHJERSEY.COM
(last updated Feb. 21, 2012, 10:29 AM), http://www.northjersey.com/news/Ex-lovers
_can_be_charged_for_posting_explicit_photos.html.
204
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or coerced with threats, weapons, or actual violence to facilitate the
recording of images.208 Once revenge pornography is circulated in
cyberspace, there is no effective technological way to stop its
distribution.
Victims of revenge pornography rarely have effective options in
209
terms of legal recourse either.
Under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, internet service providers are broadly
immunized from liability for harms caused by online content that
these companies host, and these companies do not generally have any
legal obligation to assist parties injured by online content in
identifying the human wrongdoers who post damaging materials.210
The economic incentives fall in favor of allowing customers to upload
and circulate anything they like, as broadly as they choose.211 While a
full discussion of the merits and risks of Section 230 is beyond the
scope of this Article, at the very least copyright law could be
reconfigured so that it does not provide financial incentives for the
commercial exploitation of revenge pornography.
One alternative to denying copyright protections to works of
revenge pornography would be to permit revenge porn copyrights to
be recognized and even registered, but then to vest ownership of the
copyrights in the victims, so that they could use the notice and
takedown provisions of the DMCA to try to reign in the online
distribution of works of revenge pornography. Admittedly, the
practical efficacy of either approach is likely to be limited at best,
because the goals of true revenge porn are not usually financial in

208 See Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 161 (Ct. App. 2009), available at
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1489196.html.
209 See Nancy Kim, Imposing Tort Liability on Websites for Cyber-Harassment, YLJ
ONLINE (Dec. 15, 2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/tort
-law/imposing-tort-liability-on-websites-for-cyber%11-harassment/. But see Zhang
Dongya, ‘Aids Prostitute’ a Victim of Ex’s Revenge, YNET.COM (Nov. 3, 2009, 6:23 PM),
http://bjtoday.ynet.com/3.1/0910/23/3954297.html; Mike Masnick, As Expected, Backpage
is Not Liable for Prostitution Ads, TECHDIRT (Aug. 19, 2011, 1:48 PM), http://www.tech
dirt.com/articles/20110819/02211215597/as-expected-backpage-is-not-liable-prostitution
-ads.shtml.
210 See Ali Zieglowsky, Immoral Immunity: Using a Totality of the Circumstances
Approach to Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 1307 (2010), available at http://uchastings.edu/hlj/archive/vol61
/Zieglowsky_61-HLJ-1307.pdf.
211 See David Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels? An Empirical Study
of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT (June 30,
2010),
http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2010/free-speech-savior-or-shield-scoundrels
-empirical-study-intermediary-immunity-under-sectio.
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nature. Broad distribution is usually the goal of the revenge
pornographer. But stripping copyright protections from revenge at
least has expressive value.212 And victims could perhaps take a tiny
bit of solace from the inability of their tormentors to fully
commoditize revenge pornography with government assistance.
5. Works in Which Performers Have Been Coerced, Physically
Abused, or Endangered
There are marked differences in the level of overt women-hating
present in the vast array of currently copyrighted pornographic
works.213 In pornography without overt violence or degrading acts or
language, it may well appear that everyone is enjoying themselves.
But off-camera coercion will not be apparent simply by viewing a
work. At least one feminist commentator suggests that pornographers
prey on women in precarious financial situations, citing the example
of Nadya Suleman—the mother of octuplets—who received offers to
appear in pornographic films when it became known that she was
behind on her mortgage payments.214
Physical abuse is common in pornography, and so is
endangerment; performers’ bodies are injured, and they are exposed
215
to dangerous diseases.
Pornographers have mostly successfully

212

See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME,
LAW (2004); Danielle Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber
Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1352442.
213 See, e.g., Gail Dines & Robert Jensen, The Anti-Feminist Politics Behind the
Pornography that “Empowers” Women, ZNET (Feb. 1, 2008), http://www.zcommuni
cations.org/the-anti-feminist-politics-behind-the-pornography-that-empowers-women-by
-gail-dines.
214 See What Porn is About, SKEPIFERM (Jan. 3, 2011, 2:57 AM), http://skeptifem
.blogspot.com/2011/01/what-porn-is-about.html; see also Melissa McEwan, The Porn
King with a Heart of Gold, SHAKESVILLE (Dec. 31, 2010), http://shakespeares
sister.blogspot.com/2010/12/porn-king-with-heart-of-gold.html; Shaya Tayefe Mohajer,
‘Octomom’ Eviction on Hold as Landlord Meets with Porn Producer, WASH. POST (Dec.
31, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/30 /AR201012
3004737.html; Octomom’s Calif. Home May be Sold to Porn King, CBS NEWS (Dec. 30,
2010, 6:22 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/30/entertainment/main
7198788.shtmlhttp://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/us_octomom_eviction; Porn Company ‘Vivid’
Offers to Help “Octomom” with Mortgage, KTLA.COM (Dec. 31, 2010, 4:26 AM),
http://www.ktla.com/news/landing/ktla-octomom-eviction,0,4426841.story.
215 See STOP PORN CULTURE!, http://stoppornculture.org/watch/ (last visited June 28,
2012). But see Shira Tarrant, Porn: Pleasure or Profit? Ms. Interviews Gail Dines, Part II,
MS. MAG. BLOG (July 7, 2010), http://msmagazine.com/blog/blog/2010/07/07/porn
-pleasure-or-profit-ms-interviews-gail-dines-part-ii/.
AND THE
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216

avoided health and safety regulation
and they routinely put
performers in situations that require them to eat the vomit, urine,
ejaculate, and feces of strangers; to endure penetration of their bodily
orifices by large objects that tear and damage tissue and organs; and
to engage in unprotected sex that results in rampant disease
transmission.217 The rate of sexually transmitted disease infection
218
among pornography performers is very high. Protecting copyrights
in pornographic works without protecting the workers involved in
producing these creative works is wrong at every level. Keeping the
government out of the sex and reproductive lives of its citizenry has
been a very important and extremely laudable goal of activist liberals
219
and civil libertarians for decades,
even though frank discussions
about sex may not always be officially welcome.220 But changing the
copyright laws to facilitate withholding copyright protections from
harmful pornography is an appropriate intervention that simply
reduces governmental involvement in incentivizing the production
and distribution of these harmful works.

216 Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Clinic Blasts Calls for Added Oversight of Porn Industry,
L.A. TIMES BLOG (Oct. 13, 2010, 5:09 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010
/10/following-the-announcement-this-week-that-an-adult-film-performer-tested-positive
-for-hiv-a-san-fernando-valley-clinic-relea.html. But see Alex Dobuzinskis, Los Angeles
Mayor Signs Porn Star Condom Requirement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012, 9:53 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2012/01/24/us/24reuters-condoms-porn-california.html
?_r=1&hp (reporting City of Los Angeles’ ordinance requiring condom use applies only
“to porn productions that approach the city for a permit, but officials said a permit was not
required when filming in a soundstage”).
217 Gabriel Mephibosheth, Calif. Wants Improved Occupational Health in Porn
Industry, CULTURE NEWS (June 11, 2009, 9:50 PM), http://culturecampaign.blogspot.com
/2009/06/calif-wants-improved-occupational.html; Tristan Taormino, Danger on the Set,
VILLAGE VOICE (Sept. 4, 2007), http://www.villagevoice.com/2007-09-04/columns
/danger-on-the-set/.
218 Molly Hennessy-Fiske & Rong-Gong Lin II, Porn Film Performer Tests Positive for
HIV, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2010, at AA3, available at http://articles.latimes.com
/2010/oct/13/local/la-me-porn-hiv-20101013; Ian Lovett, Condom Rule Sought for SexFilm Sets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, at A18 (detailing high rates of sexually transmitted
diseases among performers in pornography).
219 See, e.g., NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, NOW: Always on the Front Lines,
http://www.now.org/issues/abortion/reproductive_justice.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
220 When then U.S. Surgeon General Jocelyn Elders recommended promoting
masturbation to children as a safe and risk-free sexual outlet, she was fired. Douglas Jehl,
Surgeon General Forced to Resign by White House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1994, at A1.
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IV
CONSEQUENCES OF COPYRIGHT WITHHOLDING
Works produced by U.S. citizens must be registered with the U.S.
Copyright Office before they can be the basis for claims made under
the Copyright Act.221 Under Section 408(c)(1) of the Copyright Act,
“[t]he Register of Copyrights is authorized to specify by regulation
the administrative classes into which works are to be placed for
purposes of deposit and registration.”222 While it is true that the
statute specifies that “[t]his administrative classification of works has
no significance with respect to the subject matter of copyright or the
exclusive rights provided by this title,” this can be changed.223 The
Copyright Act should be amended to make pornography a specific
category of copyrightable work with the express stipulation that
harmful pornographic works are not eligible for registration or
protection.224 The Copyright Office would make the initial,
appealable decision about whether a pornographic work qualified as
non-progressive and non-useful. This would obviously require an
increase in the size and mandate of the Copyright Office.225
Copyright registrations that were improperly issued could be
invalidated if harmfulness was proven at any time. Pornographers
empirically care only about unauthorized literal copying, so as a
practical matter it is only the reproduction right that would be
contested.226 Harmfulness would also be available to defendants as a
defense to allegations of copyright infringement. If a party accused of
copyright infringement convinced a fact finder that a pornographic
work was non-progressive and non-useful and therefore unworthy of
copyright protection, there would be no enforceable copyright in the
work, and therefore nothing to infringe. While that could have the
troubling effect of incentivizing the distribution of harmful works by
third parties, because they would have nothing to fear from copyright

221

17 U.S.C. § 408 (2006).
Id.
223 Id.
224 This may require some finessing with respect to the Unites States’ obligations vis-àvis the WTO. In conversation, Kenneth Crews suggested one possible solution would be to
allow all porn to be copyrighted, but to deny remedies to harmful pornography.
225 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, WORKFORCE AND ORGANIZATION, available at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/s-plan2008/s-plan2008-2013-3.pdf (describing staffing
and operations of the U.S. Copyright Office).
226 This is somewhat amusingly ironic.
222
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law for doing so, it would simultaneously strongly disincentivize the
creation of harmful works in the first place, since they would not be
copyright protected.227 Surely it is more preferable to have one work
in which the performers were harmed copied a million times than to
have tens of thousands of works in which the performers are harmed
incentivized by governmental promulgation of the copyright laws.
Singling out pornography for disparate copyright treatment is a
radical proposition, but less extreme than it may seem at first blush.
The Copyright Act already covers some genres of creative works
while excluding others. For example, computer programs are
protectable as literary works,228 but cooking recipes are not
protectable at all;229 photographs are copyrightable,230 but hairstyles
are not.231 The exclusive rights a copyright secures differ across
categories of works.232 Even within the statutorily prescribed
233
categories, some works get different protections than others.
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held that the Copyright
Term Extension Act was constitutional in part because “Congress has
not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection” and this
made heightened First Amendment scrutiny unnecessary. 234
Legislatively establishing a category of works for which copyright
protections may be limited or denied based on their content almost
certainly alters the traditional contours of copyright law. But
amending the copyright laws to reduce the ways in which the
economic value of an original work of authorship can be exploited
would not rise to the level of “censorship” within the First
Amendment’s meaning of the word.

227 A pornography film or video can cost approximately $50,000 to produce. See
Private Worlds 2: Porn Sells?, FILM IRELAND, http://www.filmireland.net/exclusives
/privateworlds2.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
228 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS,
available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ61.pdf.
229 Recipes, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl122.html (last
updated Feb. 6, 2012).
230 Copyright
Registration of Photographs, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl107.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
231 Dennis Crouch, I Almost Cut My Hair: Haircut Property, PATENTLYO (Jan. 31,
2011),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/i-almost-cut-my-hair-haircut-property
.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PatentlyO
+%28Dennis+Crouch%27s+Patently-O%29&utm_content=FaceBook.
232 See generally Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
233 See, e.g., §§ 104A, 106A.
234 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
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It is true that government actors would have to make content-based
decisions about which pornographic works belonged in the “nonuseful” category and that would be problematic for a number of
reasons. Achieving consistent application of an even clearly
articulated standard of non-usefulness would be difficult; political
pressures might lead the relevant administrators to deprive certain
pornographic works of copyright protections overly expansively and
the buckets of money that pornographers have at their disposal to
spend on lobbyists and lawyers would ensure that the sorting process
was complicated and expensive.
Many of the early Internet-based copyright cases involved
pornographic materials, leading some practitioners to describe the
emerging field of Cyberspace Law as “The Law of Porn.”235
Companies like Playboy brought suit against online Bulletin Board
services, usenet groups, and even browser companies to try to prevent
the unauthorized uploading, hosting, and downloading of images in
which they claimed copyrights.236 Once bandwidth increased enough
so that movies could be widely sold or gifted online by so-called
pirates, pornographic works were commonly among those
distributed.237 According to one observer, “[t]he porn industry
produces 13,000 films a year, generating $10 to 15 billion in revenue.
In comparison, the Hollywood film industry produces about 600 films
a year and generates around nine to 10 billion dollars.”238 It is hard to
predict how significant the impact would be of making copyright
protections unavailable for some portion of pornographic works. At
239
present, pornographers take robust advantage of copyright law. In

235 I first heard this observation in about 1997 from Robert Hamilton, who litigated
some early Internet disputes on behalf of Compuserve and taught Cyberspace Law as an
adjunct at The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law. See generally Robert W.
Hamilton, JONES DAY, http://www.jonesday.com/rwhamilton/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
236 See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns, 354 F.3d 1020, 1022–23 (9th Cir.
2004).
237 See, e.g., Jon Swartz, Free Porn on ‘Tube Sites’ Puts a Big Dent in Industry, USA
TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2010-03-02-porn02_ST_N.htm?csp=Tech
(last updated Mar. 2, 2010, 9:59 PM).
238 Carly Perez, Professor Points Out Inequality, Racism in Porn, FOGHORN ONLINE
(Nov. 13, 2008), http://foghorn.usfca.edu/2008/11/professor-points-out-inequality-racism
-in-porn/ (citing Robert Jensen, Interfaith Summer Institute for Justice, Peace, and Social
Movements Public Forum: Pornography and the Perfect Storm of Inequality: Sexism,
Racism, and Economic Exploitation in Contemporary Pornography, (Aug. 12, 2008)).
239 See Enigmax, Porn Studios Set To Target 65,000 Movie Uploaders,
TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 12, 2009), http://torrentfreak.com/porn-studios-set-to-target-65000
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2009, one group of about fifty pornography companies brought
infringement suits against ten thousand people alleged to have made
infringing downloads of copyrighted pornographic works.240 The
pornography company Perfect 10 has been described as being on “a
litigation frenzy.”241
Another pornographer recently filed suit against over five thousand
defendants on behalf of four pornographers.242 Using the implicit
threat of exposing defendants’ pornography proclivities through
copyright litigation may be one effective way pornographers are
reaping quick and lucrative settlements.243 Folks who would not
greatly mind being publicly tagged as downloaders of bad mainstream
movies might be much more reluctant to be publicly identified as
consumers of works entitled “Explicit Violent Sexual Acts Involving
Performers Identified by Abhorrent Racial Epithets” or something
similar but far more specific. Removing the threat of copyright-based
prosecutions might lead to increased unauthorized distribution of
extant harmful works because infringing downloaders would no
longer fear infringement liability or the public censure it might
trigger. But loss of a legal tool with which to coerce cash out of
pornography consumers who feared exposure would surely also
disincentivize the production of new pornographic works if squeezing
alleged infringers is a significant source of revenue.
Pornography that was not accorded copyright protection could still
be produced in any form, and pornographers would doubtlessly

-movie-uploaders-090912/; Greg Sandoval, Porn Maker Sues 7,098 Alleged Film Pirates,
CNET (Nov. 2, 2010, 4:34 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20021438-261.html;
Swartz, supra note 237.
240 See Enigmax, supra note 239.
241 Eric Goldman, Ninth Circuit Opinion in Perfect 10 v. CCBill, ERIC GOLDMAN
TECH. & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Mar. 29, 2007), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives
/2007/03/ninth_circuit_o.htm (“Perfect 10 publishes a pornographic magazine and
operates a pornography website. It appears that Perfect 10 photos are routinely infringed
by others because Perfect 10 has been on a litigation frenzy. They have brought at least
four enforcement actions that have produced important Internet law opinions (involving
the defendants Cybernet Ventures, Visa and Google in addition to this one).”).
242 See Sandoval, supra note 239; Greg Sandoval, Porn Studios’ Copyright Lawyer: ‘I
Will Sue’ (Q&A), CNET (Oct. 5, 2010, 8:49 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3
-20018566-261.html.
243 In the United Kingdom, there are privacy laws that might apply, but the same is not
true in the United States. See, e.g., David Cairns, ACS: Law Faces Lawsuit After ‘Porn
Pirates’ Leak, THE WEEK, http://www.theweek.co.uk/technology/11229/acs-law-faces
-lawsuit-after-%E2%80%98porn-pirates%E2%80%99-leak (last updated Sept. 28, 2010,
4:14 PM).
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continue to peddle non-progressive and non-useful pornographic
wares using technologies that obstruct unauthorized copying or
redistribution. Pornographers could also continue to distribute
pornography via subscription models, for which customers enter into
enforceable contracts which impose harsh economic penalties on
subscribers who exceed the terms and conditions of their use
244
agreements.
The government would not be silencing
pornographers; it would simply be reducing the economic incentives
copyright laws provide them with respect to certain categories of
pornographic speech.
V
LESSONS FROM PATENT LAW AND TRADEMARK LAW
A. Patent Law
Until the 1950s, patent examiners sometimes denied patents to
otherwise patentable inventions on moral grounds. The Patent Act245
did not direct them to do this; the practice probably originated in
Lowell v. Lewis, an 1817 patent case in which the concepts of moral
utility and non-useful inventions were raised.246 This became far less
common by the 1970s in part because courts became wary of denying
patents based on nonstatutory moral concerns raised by unelected
government functionaries.247
Patent law, however, is not analogous enough to copyright law to
be usefully illustrative. Adding moral dimensions to copyright law by
denying copyright protections to harmful pornography would be
effectuated via the legislative process through changes to the
Copyright Act. If a work is deemed unworthy of copyright protection
by the Copyright Office, the decision would be based on a targeted
administrative review, rather than being one small component of the
lengthy, detailed, and expensive examination process that patent
applications undergo.
Moreover, a patent describing a non-useful, non-progressive
product or process can issue without the invention ever being made or

244

See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 45.
35 U.S.C. §§ 1–293 (1952).
246 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 177 (5th ed. 2009).
247 Id.
245

BARTOW

2012]

10/4/2012 2:20 PM

Copyright Law and Pornography

53

practiced. A patent that teaches people skilled in the relevant art how
to construct something dangerous can be secured, its circulation
limited, and laws can be passed to prevent people from practicing
248
harmful inventions as necessary. This is a different situation from
copyright law where, for example, a movie in which children are
raped or performers are injured receives copyright only after the work
is completed and the production-based harm is already done.
Morality is a patentability consideration in Europe, and there are
249
still moral questions that are bound up with U.S. patent law.
Professor Margo Bagley, for example, has questioned the “patent
first, ask questions later” approach of the United States, particularly
with regard to controversial biotechnology-related subject matter.250
Moral considerations could become explicitly addressed by the Patent
Act in the future.
B. Trademark Law
Pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, a trademark shall be
refused registration on the principal register “on account of its nature”
if it “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive or scandalous
matter.”251 The body of law that has developed from judicial
interpretations of this statutory limitation over time is admittedly
252
incoherent.
Trademarks referencing sex, race, religion, sexual
orientation, and scatological imagery have all been denied registration
under Section 2(a), apparently constitutionally. To list just a few
examples, the following marks were found to be too immoral and
scandalous to warrant federal registration on the principal registry: (1)

248 See, e.g., Shawn J. Kolitch, The Proper Scope of Patentability in International Law,
11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 149, 165–77 (2007) (describing legal approaches in
other countries to harmful inventions).
249 See, e.g., Astrid Burhöi, Moral Exclusions in European Biotechnology Patent Law
(Ekonomi HÖGskolan, Lunds Universites), available at http://biblioteket.ehl.lu.se
/olle/papers/0002294.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2011); OLIVER MILLS, BIOTECHNOLOGICAL
INVENTIONS: MORAL RESTRAINTS AND PATENT LAW (2005).
250 See Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later, Morality and
Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003), available at
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol45/iss2/3/.
251 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006).
252 See, e.g., Llewellyn Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and the
Disparaging: Section 2(A) Trademark Law after Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 187 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=870321.
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“Cocaine” as the trademark for a soft drink;
(2) “Pussy” for an
energy drink;254 (3) “Bullshit” for a wide variety of beverages;255 (4)
the terms BONG HITS 4 JESUS256 and DE PUTA MADRE (“whore
257
258
mother”) for clothing;
(5) “Dick Heads” for a restaurant;
and
259
(6)”You cum like a girl” for clothing. Marks that survived Section
2(a) challenges include “Big Pecker’s” for a restaurant, “Redskins”
for a football team, “Bad Frog” for beer (depicting a frog holding up
its “middle finger”), “Dykes on Bikes” for a women’s motorcycle
club, and “Black Tail” for an adult entertainment magazine featuring
photographs of both naked and scantily-clad African-American
women.260
Despite the stunning lack of discernible consistency in the rulings
under Section 2(a) on what constitutes a mark that is scandalous and
immoral,261 this provision has never been held to violate the First
262
Amendment. Marks that cannot be federally registered can still be

253 In re James T. Kirby, 2008 WL 4674566, at *1 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (not precedential),
available at http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/ReterivePdf?flNm=77006212-09-22-2008&system
=TTABIS. Mr. Kirby’s company is Redux Beverages, which started marketing the soft
drink in 2006. Id.
254 See Ann Bartow, Too Scandalous to be a Registered Trademark: “Pussy Natural
Energy”, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (June 2, 2009), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com
/2009/06/too-scandalous-to-be-a-registered-trademark-pussy-natural-energy/.
255 In re Red Bull GmbH, 2006 WL 478985 (T.T.A.B. 2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/foia/ttab/2aissues/2006/75788830.pdf.
256 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,305,946 (filed Oct. 17, 2007), available
at http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser=serial&entry=77305946.
257 In re Mexico 69 SRL, 2006 WL 2558009 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (not precedential),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/foia/ttab/2aissues/2006/78361172
.pdf.
258 In re Wilcher Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d, 1929, 1931 (T.T.A.B. 1996).
259 See Ann Bartow, I Don’t Own a Tee Shirt, or Any Other Garment, that Says: “You
Cum Like a Girl”, FEMINIST LAW PROFESSORS (Sept. 9, 2006), http://www.feministlaw
professors.com/2006/09/i-dont-own-a-tee-shirt-or-any-other-garments-that-say-you-cum
-like-a-girl/.
260 In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994), available at
http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/33/33.F3d.1367.93-1464.html.
261 See T.M.E.P. § 1203.01, Immoral or Scandalous Matter, BITLAW, http://www
.bitlaw.com/source/tmep/1203_01.html (last visited July 2, 2012) (noting that “Section
2(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a), is an absolute bar to the registration of
immoral or scandalous matter on either the Principal Register or the Supplemental
Register”).
262 Though marks may constitute commercial speech, the commercial speech doctrine,
to the extent one still exists, has had a meaningful role in First Amendment analyses of
section 2 of the Lanham Act. See Sonya Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1601 (2010); see also Gibbons, supra note 252.

BARTOW

2012]

10/4/2012 2:20 PM

Copyright Law and Pornography

55

used in commerce, and that appears to keep this content-based
trademark registration restriction within the bounds of
constitutionality. One can hope that sorting out which pornographic
works should be deemed non-useful, and therefore outside the scope
of copyright protections, could be accomplished with more
consistency and predictability, given that the bases on which to deny
copyright protection discussed above allow for more evidence-based
determinations that do not take subjective social morality concerns
into account. The concerns driving this denial of government
resources are for people directly harmed by the production and
distribution of the pornography, not for an anonymous audience of
consumers.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment may secure citizens with the right to produce
and distribute harmful works of pornography. Certainly that is the
current state of free speech jurisprudence. But there is no legal
requirement that the government provide economic incentives for the
creation of harmful pornographic works. With the current practice of
indiscriminately according pornographic works copyright protection,
the government encourages and incentivizes the production of
pornography that is non-progressive and non-useful and therefore
beyond the scope of the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. This must cease. Amending the Copyright Act to reduce
the ways in which the economic value of harmful pornography can be
exploited via copyright law is a legitimate policy choice that Congress
can and should make immediately.
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